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Fifteen years after the passage of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), we stand at a series of crossroads. Support for personal criminal responsibility 
for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes remains robust in many parts of 
the world, yet the ICC faces considerable obstacles and universal jurisdiction of national 
courts is in a period of retrenchment.
Accountability mechanisms in peace agreements are hard to come by. The ICC has 
faced sustained criticism from African leaders for its alleged selectivity, and elsewhere 
as well for its inability to address alleged violations by major powers, leaving the court 
open to the accusation that it only dispenses justice on weaker states. Even UN Security 
Council referrals, once thought to enhance the reach of the Court, are proving prob-
lematic. Along with the criticisms of the likes of Henry Kissinger attacking the principle 
of universal jurisdiction of national courts, major powers (notably China) have made 
repeated claims that the very notion of universal jurisdiction represents a “Western” 
imposition on non-Western peoples – effectively an act of 21st century imperialism. 
Finally, the simultaneous pursuit of peace and justice is proving more elusive than once 
thought.
And yet, the struggle for enhanced accountability continues in a variety of settings, from 
Spain (addressing military rule in Latin America and the Franco era), to Belgium, France 
and Canada (where the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act precedes the 
establishment of the ICC). Avenues have opened up for civil society actors as well as 
jurists to seek justice for crimes that have otherwise gone unpunished by states either un-
willing or too weak to enforce their own laws. This makes it possible for groups as varied 
as indigenous peoples in Canada and victims of violence in Guatemala to challenge 
traditional jurisdictional limits in their efforts to gain redress for their grievances. We 
have compelling evidence from Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere that the criminal 
prosecutions that have resulted from these pressures have significantly enhanced demo-
cratic practice and civil society in regions with long histories of political violence and 
authoritarian rule. Accountability for international crimes and its cognates thus create 
a complex alchemy. It became a new basis upon which global actors and international 
organizations have sought to enact the promise of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR), but it has also allowed local actors in a variety of contexts to 
seek new ways of addressing pressing concerns.
The goal of this conference was to assess the current state of international criminal justice 
through a close examination of the workings of International Criminal Court, related 
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tribunals and national courts exercising both their domestic and universal jurisdiction. 
We assembled a globally renowned group of experts, to consider criminal account-
ability for large-scale acts of political violence through a series of lenses, from those of 
legal practitioners, scholars, international actors and activists who seek to utilize or chal-
lenge the viability of the concept. In this sense our conference will both be about legal 
theory and the day-to-day workings of the law in a variety of contexts and jurisdictions.
Most importantly, our goal was not simply to understand how international criminal 
justice has evolved since the creation of the ICC. We aim to offer a vision of the future 
path for this concept, and its viability in a global context in which state-sponsored 
violence and the potency of non-state actors remain a significant challenge to account-
ability and justice. We also seek to explore its viability in a series of local contexts in 
which global networks of activists, jurists, and scholars continue to press the case for 
accountability : local efforts to prosecute former military and government officials in 
Argentina, Chile, Peru, Guatemala and elsewhere for human rights violations dating to 
the 1960s remain unabated. Meanwhile, general amnesties are no longer the standard 
fare of negotiated peace agreements while realistic accountability measures are dif-
ficult to enact, more so even to implement.
In the following pages readers will find a session by session narrative describing the 
presentations and discussions that comprised the conference, followed by a series of 
concluding remarks authored by the Honourable Louise Arbour. Wherever possible we 
used the precise words of the speakers, editing only in order to make the shift from 
the spoken to the written word comprehensible, and because of space limitations. The 
presentations are attributed to the speakers, but most comments in the discussions have 
been anonymized, as per the wishes of the participants.
The Honourable Louise Arbour, CC, G.O.C.
Simons Visiting Chair in Dialogue on International Law and Human Security
Simon Fraser University
Jennifer Allen Simons, CM
President, The Simons Foundation
Alexander Dawson
Director, School for International Studies
Simon Fraser University
I n t e r n a t I o n a l  c r I m I n a l  J u s t I c e 9
o P e n I n g  r e m a r k s
To set the tone for the conference, the three co-conveners used their opening remarks 
to press the participants to address a number of the critical questions that confront 
International Criminal Justice today. Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, President of The Simons 
Foundation, explained that the intent of this event was to bring the leading academic 
theorists and practitioners of international criminal justice together to assess the global 
effort to combat crimes against humanity and mass atrocities, with a particular interest 
in addressing the widespread problem of impunity. Quoting the Conference’s Chair-
person, The Honourable Louise Arbour, Dr. Simons asked one of the core questions that 
haunts endeavors to prosecute war crimes. “Are we too ambitious about changing the 
world ?” Simons’ answer to this question was a resounding “no !”, offering that “it is 
essential that we surpass the ambitions of the power-hungry and the greedy… those 
who disregard human lives in their decision-making… We must accept it will always 
be an uphill struggle, but we must strive for universality of all human rights and human 
lives… We are here today to further the goals of true universal justice.” Dr. Simons 
ended her opening remarks by linking universal justice to the need for perpetrators to 
be brought to justice.
Alexander Dawson, Director of the School for International Studies, took a more pes-
simistic approach, commenting that he is “still struggling with questions about victor’s 
ideas imposed on vanquished.” Prof. Dawson noted that from Adolf Eichmann to the 
present, the question remains : “can powerful heads of state in victor nations be held 
accountable ?” He continued by contemplating the 2011 visit by former US Vice Presi-
dent Dick Cheney 2011 to Vancouver, during which protestors kept him sequestered in 
a downtown private club for several hours. Those protestors insisted both that Cheney 
was a war criminal, and that Canadian law and treaty obligations required that he 
be detained. In the end, Cheney was inconvenienced, but that was the sum total of his 
punishment. Dawson ended his opening remarks by asking a key question : “how do we 
take concepts of international justice and truly make them universal ? 
The Honourable Louise Arbour, SFU Simons Visiting Chair in Dialogue on International 
Law and Human Security and Chair of the Conference, then took the microphone. “I hope 
our conversation,” she said, “will position itself somewhere between habitual cheerlead-
ing, which has taken place for a long time, and the increasing heavily negative commen-
taries that risk playing into the hands of those who may share our assessment but may 
want to sabotage the entire enterprise. There is in between a need for sober criticism.”
Dr. Arbour continued, commenting that although she has not directly engaged in interna-
tional criminal justice for a while, her interest and commitment has not waned, and she 
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believed that Dr. Simon’s optimism was not misplaced. “As a criminal law professor 30 
years ago, I would have never believed criminal law would take root in the international 
sphere in my lifetime. But it has.” 
When she left the Office of Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) in 1999, Arbour told her colleagues 
that “the international criminal justice process is irreversible.” Over twenty years later, 
she still believes in its irreversibility, but conceded that she has “a lot less clarity on the 
shape and form it will take.” Her hope for the conference was to explore core doctrinal 
assumptions regarding universal jurisdiction and institutional frameworks. The current 
events surrounding Palestine’s engagement with the ICC show that the Court’s legitimacy 
has increased, according to Arbour. She hoped that we could “celebrate the expan-
sion of accountability while also recognizing how this will probably contribute to an 
increased hostility toward the International Criminal Court in the US.”
Dr. Arbour concluded her opening remarks by noting that, “although this movement is 
irreversible it needs sober encouragement, not cheerleading.” She argued that there is 
a “need to articulate pathways to assist our efforts in the fight against impunity, and the 
expansion of a reasonable system of accountability. We need an ambitious but realistic 
agenda – both highly desirable while eminently deliverable.”
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Stephen Toope, A Critical Analysis of the Concept of ‘Fragmentation’ 
and the Normative Legitimacy of International Criminal Justice 
Richard A. Falk, The Long March to End Impunity for State Crimes of 
Aggression and Crimes against Humanity
James Stewart (ICC), Prevention : Will it ever be realizable ?
Overview : The first panel of the conference highlighted several competing views on the 
nature of  the accomplishments of  the ICTR,  ICTY, and ICC. Stephen Toope presented a 
wide  range evidence  in  support of his position  that  the embrace of  fragmentation and 
legal pluralism were not only pragmatic approaches to the problems of international crimi-
nal  law,  they were also  largely positive steps  toward an  improved human rights  regime 
globally. James Stewart, the practicing prosecutor on the panel, clearly saw the deficien-
cies and incapacities of the ICC, but argued that the accomplishments of the Court were 
significant, and that the positive effects of the ICC on domestic contexts were not yet fully 
understood or accounted for. Richard Falk observed that many of the most profound issues 
of international criminal justice seem to be beyond the scope of the ICC, and in the discus-
sion reminded participants that these issues must remain on the public agenda.
The panel began with a sweeping analysis by Stephen Toope of the theoretical and 
practical problems facing the implantation of International Criminal law. Framing his 
talk as a meditation on the of embracing “fragmentation” as a workable legal prin-
ciple, Prof. Toope noted that, although Canadian and American scholars express unease 
about the concept, as it seems to indicate weak systems and imperfect justice, European 
scholars tended to have a more positive view. Moreover, fragmentation is not just found 
in international law (IL) and international criminal law (ICL) but in domestic settings as 
well. “I want to say that we should stop worrying about fragmentation in IL and ICL.” 
Prof. Toop’s presentation follows. 
From a theoretical perspective, fragmentation is best viewed as a value-free concept in 
relation to any given institutional setting. It is inherently neither good nor bad. Even in 
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domestic law settings a multiplicity of adjudicative mechanisms or jurisdictions can pro-
duce diversity in approaches and outcomes. We are certainly familiar with that reality 
in Canada. When I studied criminal law in Quebec – and remember that criminal law 
is within the federal heads of jurisdiction – I soon learned that even the cases cited by 
Quebec courts were often different from those cited in Ontario or BC. Some of that was 
language, meaning mostly that many Ontario and BC judges did not read in French. But 
it was also interpretive temperament : Quebec judges tended to be gentler with young 
offenders, for example. General approaches to sentencing were often different.
While it is true that in domestic legal systems there is usually more capacity for 
coordination and supervision, differences in approach are not invariably settled simply 
through the assertion of authority within a judicial hierarchy. Often, courts engage in 
what Peter Hogg has described, drawing on Supreme Court of Canada cases starting 
with Vriend, as a “dialogue” amongst themselves and also between the courts and the 
legislatures, finally settling at a point of temporary equilibrium.
The dialogic metaphor is apt internationally as well. Courts speak with one another. 
Interpretive friction is a constant because legal principles are worked out in different 
legal and factual contexts. Stable approaches in law tend to be iterated over time with 
the accretion of practice. The dispute on the right test for imputability for war crimes 
(“overall control” vs. “effective control”) between the Tadic tribunal of the ICTY and the 
ICJ in the Nicaragua and Genocide cases is the most famous and pointed example.
“The international legitimacy of  international criminal law is threatened 
– not by fragmentation and pluralism – but by inability to deliver on its 
promises because of  institutional ineffectiveness. Our focus needs to be on 
political, economic and institutional will.” — Stephen Toope
But international criminal courts also speak to states and states speak back to interna-
tional courts. One of the ICC Statute’s fundamental principles, complementarity, is an 
expression of the dialogic relationship between international and national justice. Inter-
national courts can establish and interpret key definitions of international crimes, and try 
the most senior offenders. National courts should treat the international court interpre-
tations as persuasive authority, and pursue justice in relation to lower-level offenders.
While there is never likely to be what some writers have called a “master procedural 
model” of international criminal justice that ensures conformity amongst all tribunals, 
international and national, there can nonetheless be a “common grammar” that shapes 
decisions in similar directions.
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This idea of a generative dialogic relationship connects to a second theoretical reason 
why we should not worry about fragmentation. International law has long recognized 
the need for some degree of normative pluralism. From the now weak persistent objec-
tor rule related to the formation of customary international law, to the possibility of 
reservations to treaties, the idea that not all rules are truly universal or entirely uniform 
has been accepted. This translates into the essentially practical point that international 
criminal law, like all public international law, has never been an entirely unified field. So 
there is no fundamental coherence that is being lost.
Indeed, the framework of relative normative pluralism may be a helpful way to conceive 
of international criminal law. Not only does ICL have to interact with a remarkable 
diversity of regulatory spaces (national jurisdictions around the world), but it has to 
engage with many different socio-cultural frames and political contexts. If the world is, 
as I think it is, “morally pluralistic” (to adopt the great liberal theorist, Judith Shklar’s 
term), then ICL may be best understood as a set of overlapping but not necessarily 
uniform concepts of individual criminal responsibility overseen by a relatively loose 
network of judicial actors. 
In other words, fears around fragmentation were always overstated, even at a concep-
tual level. Interestingly, one of the most powerful voices who decried the development 
of a fragmented international law has recanted. Martii Koskenniemi now suggests that 
“fragmentation did not turn out to create the chaos that was feared.”
In practical terms as well, we have nothing to fear from relative pluralism in ICL. In fact, 
it is that very pluralism that may actually produce the effects that we seek to achieve in 
the promotion of international criminal responsibility.
If we begin with the proposition that ICL continues to face what some commentators 
have called an “identity crisis” because of the inherent conflict between the demands 
for “due process” and “an end to impunity,” it seems more likely that the right balance 
will be struck closer to the ground, so to speak – in the societies where criminal activities 
were committed.
The fundamental principle of complementarity found in the Rome Statute speaks to this 
reality ; it runs parallel to the EU’s concept of subsidiarity. Decision-making should take 
place as close as possible to the people affected by the decisions. The decisions are 
more likely to hit needed balances and may be assimilated into society more easily. 
The difficulty that the ICC has had in dealing with the Kenyan situation is an example of 
what does not work.
There is also solid evidence that decisions rendered in situ are more likely to lead 
to understanding by the population and to social learning. The dialogic metaphor is 
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reinforced because states and their institutions can learn and recalibrate in the light of 
localized ICL decisions. Studies of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals indicate 
that local people have known little about them and that the results are often experienced 
as foreign impositions. Local learning does not take place. The International Criminal 
Court has been criticized because it has done little to help support national-level pros-
ecutions. What is more, in dealing with the traumatic after-effects of situations that rise 
to the level of ICL, court adjudication of individual perpetrators is only part of a wider 
set of processes at different policy levels within and between states. Learning should 
take place in these varied processes as well.
Recent research has demonstrated that ICL can be implemented by a variety of institu-
tions, not only by international criminal courts. National courts can play an important 
role, of course, but ICL was built in part because of the recognition that states may fail 
to act when they should for complex social and political reasons. They may need a push. 
But that push can be made by human right tribunals as well as by international criminal 
courts.
A brilliant recent study of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights by Alexandra 
Huneeus shows that the Court has ordered prosecutions for gross human rights offenses 
in roughly 51 cases across 15 states since 1996. It has then actively monitored, even 
supervised, prosecutions at the national level, resulting in 39 convictions as of 2013. The 
supervision can be quite detailed, telling national prosecutors what lines of investigation 
to explore, naming specific individuals, and suggesting analytical connections between 
related cases. This results in powerful “teaching opportunities” for national-level justice 
officials.
If one links this study of the Inter-American Court to recent analyses of the effectiveness 
of international courts generally, one is forced to the conclusion that the ICC, with its two 
convictions and a budget of roughly $130 million per year is not meeting its objectives. 
Of course, the objectives of ICL are diverse and complicated : retribution and punishment 
of individuals ; satisfying victims’ need for closure ; further developing the framework 
for legal liability ; meeting the psychological need for memorialization of traumatic 
events and to remember victims ; promoting social stability and security ; creating op-
portunities for reconciliation ; and reinforcing legal values outside the direct criminal 
context such as fairness and equality. It is hard to meet them all. But goal uncertainty is 
a notorious indicator of likely institutional failure. Normative legitimacy is undermined 
by ineffectiveness. When there is an almost complete failure to deliver in practice on the 
normative promises of the law, the law itself is degraded.
I offer five specific solutions. First, we should stop worrying about fragmentation in 
international law, and particularly in international criminal law. Second, some degree 
of normative pluralism is inherent in an international society marked by moral pluralism. 
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Third, complementarity is the correct approach for pursuing effective ICL. In fact, we 
should look to a diversity of institutions to instantiate and develop the law, not only 
domestic courts and international criminal courts. The role of human rights tribunals is 
under-explored and under-promoted. Fourth, the educative role of ICL, and its ability 
to help positively shape the future of fractured and fragile national societies, is best 
pursued through local-level actions – national prosecutions and other policy instruments 
that are grounded in criminal responsibility but that are targeted to meet specific goals 
of international criminal justice, such as reconciliation and memorialization. Last, the 
normative legitimacy of ICL is threatened today, not by fragmentation or pluralism, but 
by the ineffectiveness of central institutions like the International Criminal Court.
. . .
In the second presentation on this panel Richard Falk focused on the lengthy and often 
tendentious struggles to address the impunity that state actors often enjoy in committing 
crimes against humanity. Prof. Falk suggested that our desire for a just world order must 
be tempered with realism about the world as it actually is. As it works now, international 
criminal law “is a voluntary system for the powerful, and an obligatory system for the 
others.” Inasmuch as without equality before the law we really do not have the rule 
of law, we need “a profound transformation in political consciousness. Even the most 
powerful countries should welcome the constraints of international law to govern their 
practices.”
The text upon which his talk was based is reproduced below.
Under pressure from the usual sources William Schabas has resigned as Chair of the 
expert commission of inquiry into war crimes allegations arising from the Israeli military 
operations in Gaza during July and August of 2014. These issues relating to interna-
tional criminal accountability have also received recent prominence due to Palestine’s 
adherence to the Rome Treaty making it a party to the International Criminal Court, an 
initiative that generated a furious reaction on the part of Israel as well as an angry 
denunciation by Washington. On display in these instances is the struggle between 
extending the rule of law to international state crimes and the geopolitical resistance 
to such an effort.
Imposing international criminal responsibility upon political leaders and military com-
manders possesses a dual character from a geopolitical perspective : to vindicate major 
military undertakings of liberal democratic states and to ensure impunity for the leaders 
of these same states in the event that their behavior or that of their allies are alleged 
to be international crimes. These efforts at vindication are associated with strengthening 
the global rule of law, while impunity is invoked to insulate powerful individuals from 
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criminal accountability. The resulting pattern is one of double standards and hypocritical 
rhetoric about the importance of the rule of law.
“International criminal law is a voluntary system for the powerful, 
and an obligatory system for the others… What is needed is a profound 
transformation in political consciousness. Even the most powerful countries 
should welcome the constraints of  international law to govern in their 
practices.” — Richard Falk
Contemporary experience with these issues is grounded in the aftermath of World War II 
– especially in Nuremberg, where the legal prosecution of surviving Nazi leaders began 
with great fanfare in 1945, but also at Tokyo, where a series of prominent Japanese 
personalities who had headed the imperial government and commanded its military 
forces were accused of international crimes. These sophisticated “show trials” were gen-
erally endorsed in the West as a civilized alternative to the favored Soviet approach, 
which was to arrange summary mass executions of all Germans deemed responsible 
for international crimes without making any effort to assess the gravity or accuracy of 
the charges directed at specific individuals. What was done at Nuremberg in 1945 
was for prosecutors to prepare carefully evidence of alleged wrongdoing as well as 
developing arguments about the legal relevance of the international crime while giving 
those accused an almost free hand to offer legal defenses and mitigating evidence as 
prepared by competent lawyers appointed to render them assistance.
In most respects, Nuremberg in particular continues to be viewed as a landmark success 
in the annals of the progressive development of international law. It is also significant 
that the outcomes of parallel Tokyo prosecutions of Japanese leaders are virtually 
unknown except in Japan, where they are decried as “victors’ justice”, and among a few 
specialists in international criminal law.
There are several reasons for the prominence of Nuremberg. First of all, the disclosures 
of the Holocaust at Nuremberg were so ghastly that some sort of punishment of those 
responsible seemed to be a moral imperative at the time.
Although the crime of genocide did not yet exist in law, the revelations of the Nuremberg 
proceedings documented as never before the systematic extermination of Jews and others 
in Europe. Beyond this, the war was widely believed to have been just and necessary. 
The Allied victory was viewed as decisive in overcoming the fascist challenge to liberal 
democracy, with the Nuremberg Judgment providing an authoritative rationale for a 
war so costly in lives, devastation, and resources. Finally, the claim to be establishing a 
structure of legal accountability that took precedence over national law seemed inte-
gral to the post-war resolve to keep the peace in the future and deter aggression by 
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threatening leaders with criminal accountability for initiating a war or abusing people 
under their control. The advent of nuclear weaponry reinforced the moral and political 
conviction that major wars must now be prevented by all available means, including this 
warning to leaders and military commanders that their actions could become the subject 
of criminal prosecution.
At the same time, this Nuremberg/Tokyo experiment was tainted from the outset. It was 
clearly victors’ justice that incorporated double standards. The evident crimes of the 
winners in the war were not even investigated, including the atomic bombings of two 
Japanese cities, which were viewed around the world as perhaps the worst single acts 
of wrongdoing throughout the course of the entire war, and only the Nazi death camps 
were in some way equivalent in relation to legality and morality. There were official 
statements made at Nuremberg that those who sat in judgment of the Germans would 
in the future be subject to similar procedures of accountability if they committed acts 
that seemed to be crimes under international law, implying that the rule of law would 
replace victors’ justice. In effect, the claim made on behalf of moral credibility and 
political fairness was that this Nuremberg/Tokyo approach would take on the attributes 
of the rule of law by treating equals equally. Such expectations, if scrutinized, seemed 
to reflect the hopes of “liberal legalists”, but were never realistic given the structure and 
nature of world politics.
In effect, this Nuremberg promise could not be kept because geopolitical primacy con-
tinues to set the limits of legal accountability. Although there has existed an International 
Criminal Court since 2002, and ample grounds for believing that some major sovereign 
states have committed international crimes, there have zero prosecutions directed at 
dominant political actors, and no investigations have been launched. Such a pattern 
results from a normative gap in world order that is not likely to be closed soon. It is a 
gap that is most visibly expressed by conferring a right of veto upon the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, which amounts to constitutional grants of exemption 
from any legal obligation to comply with the UN Charter on matters of peace and secu-
rity. In this regard, the UN Charter is itself a product of what might be called “geopolitical 
realism” which takes precedence over the apolitical aspirations of “liberal legalists”.
And yet, the impulse to hold accountable those who commit crimes against the peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity remains strong among moderate democratic 
governments and in global civil society. As a result there is some further development 
of the Nuremberg idea, although the fundamental tensions between hard power and 
establishing a credible rule of law remains. During the 1990s the UN Security Council 
established ad hoc international tribunals to assess criminal responsibility associated 
with the breakup of former Yugoslavia and in relation to the genocidal massacres in 
Rwanda. In these North/South settings, there was more willingness to allow all sides to 
bring forth their arguments about the criminal behavior of their adversary since there 
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were no allegations against geopolitical heavyweights. That is, the approach of liberal 
legalists can be practical in situations where no high profile geopolitical actor is being 
accused.
The International Criminal Court was itself brought into being in 2002 by an unusual 
coalition of forces, joining governments with NGOs around the world in a joint project. 
What exists is an international institution with a mandate to investigate and prosecute, 
but lacking the participation and support of the dominant states, and operating within a 
framework that up to now has been deferential to the sensitivities of sovereign states in 
the West. Operating in such a limited way has led the ICC in its first decade to focus its 
attention almost entirely on African leaders, while looking the other way with respect to 
geopolitical actors. Liberals conceive of this as progress, doing what can be done, and 
beneficial to the extent that it apprehends some persons who have been responsible for 
atrocities and crimes against humanity. Critics of the ICC view it as another venue for 
the administration of victors’ justice and Western moral hegemony that entails a cynical 
expression of double standards. Both interpretations are plausible. The ICC is currently 
facing an identity test as to whether it will undertake investigations of alleged Israeli 
criminality made at the request of Palestine. Its institutional weight is being demon-
strated by the degree to which the Israeli leadership reacts with fury, punitive policies, 
and intense anger directed at the Palestinian Authority for raising such a possibility, and 
Israel’s backlash is supported by the United States.
For centuries there has been recognized the capacity of national courts to act as agents 
of law enforcement in relation to international wrongdoing. Such a judicial role was 
long exercised in Western countries in relation to international piracy, which was viewed 
as a crime against the whole world and hence could be prosecuted anywhere. Such 
an extension of international criminal law is based on ideas of universal jurisdiction, 
strengthening the capacity of international society to address serious crimes of state. 
This kind of approach received great attention in relation to allegations of torture made 
against the former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, after he was detained by Britain 
in response to a 1998 request for extradition by Spain where a court stood ready to 
prosecute on the basis of indictments already made. After a series of legal proceedings 
in Britain the House of Lords, acting as the country’s highest judicial body, decided 
that Pinochet should be extradited, but only for torture charges relating to a period 
after torture became an international crime within Britain. In theory, national courts 
could become much more active in relation to universal jurisdiction if so empowered by 
parliamentary mandate, but again doing so without challenging geopolitical red lines. 
When Belgian courts threatened to proceed against Donald Rumsfeld because of his al-
leged authorization of torture in Iraq, political pressures were mounted by Washington, 
including even threats to move NATO headquarters. In the end, Belgium backed down 
by revising its national criminal code so as to make it much more difficult to prosecute 
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international crimes that occurred outside of Belgium and for which Belgians were not 
victims or perpetrators.
Civil society has also acted to close the normative gap created by patterns of geopoliti-
cal impunity. In the midst of the Vietnam War, motivated by a sense of moral outrage 
and the paralysis of official institutions when it came to challenging American behavior, 
Bertrand Russell organized a symbolic legal proceeding that investigated charges of 
criminality in 1966 and 1967. Prominent intellectuals from around the world who were 
invited to serve as a jury of conscience heard evidence, issuing their opinion as to law 
and facts at the end. Inspired by this Russell Tribunal experience, the Permanent Peoples 
Tribunal was established a decade later by citizens, operating out of Rome, holding 
sessions on issues where there existed moral outrage, legal prohibitions, and institutional 
paralysis, symbolically challenging geopolitical impunity. In 2005 there was organized 
in Istanbul by a dedicated group of female activists an independent tribunal to inves-
tigate war crimes charges against British and American political and military leaders, 
as well as corporate actors associated with the Iraq War. The Iraq War Tribunal relied 
upon a jury of conscience chaired by Arundhati Roy to pronounce upon the evidence. 
Of course, such a tribunal can only challenge impunity symbolically by influencing public 
opinion, and possibly through encouraging boycotts and other moves that delegitimize 
the claimants of power and possibly alter the political climate.
In summary, it is still accurate to observe that geopolitical primacy inhibits the imple-
mentation of international criminal law from the perspective of a global rule of law 
regime that treats equals equally. At the same time, ever since Nuremberg there have 
been efforts to end the impunity of those guilty of international crimes in war and peace 
situations and national settings of oppressive rule. These efforts have taken several main 
forms : 1) the establishment by the UN of ad hoc tribunals with a specific mandate, as 
with former Yugoslavia and Rwanda ; 2) the establishment of a treaty-based interna-
tional institution, the International Criminal Court, with limited participation and disap-
pointing results to date ; 3) reliance on universal jurisdiction to activate national courts to 
act as agents on behalf of international society with respect to enforcing international 
criminal law ; and 4) the formation of civil society tribunals to assess criminal responsibility 
of leaders in situations of moral outrage and global settings that render unavailable 
either inter-governmental or governmental procedures of accountability.
In the end, there is posed a choice. One possibility is go along with the one-eyed efforts of 
liberal legalists, most notably mainstream NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, silently 
acknowledging that the rule of law cannot be expected to function in relation to many 
serious international crimes due to the hierarchical and hegemonic structure of inter-
national society. The other possibility is to insist there can be no international justice so 
long as there exists a regime of “geopolitical impunity”. In both instances, the contribu-
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tions of civil society tribunals are needed, both for the sake of symbolic indictment and 
documentation of wrongdoing, and to acknowledge civil society as the moral and legal 
conscience of humanity. It must be admitted that only among liberal democracies are 
such self-critical initiatives of civil society tolerated, although these undertakings are 
derided and marginalized as the work of a “kangaroo court”. Obama’s refusal to look 
back at the international crimes alleged against leading members of the Bush presi-
dency is one awkward admission of the limits on legal accountability ; such reasoning 
if generalized would invalidate any concern with past behavior, and hence any notion 
of accountability for all crimes. In other words, without kangaroo courts there would no 
courts at all to assess the severe criminality of the most powerful political actors on the 
world stage.
. . .
The third presentation on this panel was made by James Stewart, Deputy Prosecutor at 
the International Criminal Court. [Editor’s note : the conference included two participants 
named James Stewart. The other James Stewart is currently a Law Professor at the Uni-
versity of British Columbia.] Mr. Stewart focused on the question of whether or not the 
prevention of mass atrocities is a realizable goal of international criminal justice. His 
notes are excerpted below.
The investigation of mass atrocities and the prosecution and conviction of the perpetra-
tors of such crimes may punish criminals and bring some measure of justice to victims and 
communities affected by the crimes, but will they deter future crimes ? Such a question 
has pre-occupied the administration of criminal justice – not just international criminal 
justice – since the beginning.
The framers of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court had as a goal 
the deterrence of mass atrocity crimes. Prevention is an objective expressed in the 
preamble to the Rome Statute as a reason for the Court’s creation. This goal is to be 
achieved, under the Rome Statute, through the effective prosecution and punishment of 
the perpetrators of such crimes.
The ICC was established to “put an end to impunity” and “thus to contribute to the pre-
vention” of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Future reduction in mass 
atrocities, however, may be due to factors other than just the punishment of perpetra-
tors, factors such as restoration of peace, better security, increases in prosperity, the 
development of inclusive political institutions, enhancement of a culture of respect for 
basic human rights, and so on.
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“In my current role as Deputy Prosecutor at the ICC, I must work on the 
basis that this is a valid assumption and do all I can to help the ICC achieve 
success. Certainly, effective prosecution of  the perpetrators of  mass 
crimes serves a valid purpose – and it may contribute to the evolution 
of  a broader culture of  deterrence” — James Stewart (ICC Prosecutor)
The process will be a complex one, and many factors will come into play. It is also a 
process that may be very difficult to measure with any confidence in the accuracy of any 
inferences we care to draw. The key factor may be the development of respect for basic 
human rights the world over and of a global culture of shared values that discourages 
the commission of mass atrocities. Human civilization is obviously very far from achieving 
such goals, yet an underlying assumption of international criminal justice, as framed in 
the Rome Statute of the ICC, is that effective prosecution will contribute to the prevention 
of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
In my current role as Deputy Prosecutor at the ICC, I must work on the basis that this is 
a valid assumption and do all I can to help the ICC achieve success. Certainly, effective 
prosecution of the perpetrators of mass crimes serves a valid purpose – and it may 
contribute to the evolution of a broader culture of deterrence.
The massacres that ensued from the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 occurred after the 
UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established and func-
tioning. The existence of the ICTY and the possibility of prosecution did not prevent that 
tragedy from happening.
Yet, after convictions of key actors in the Srebrenica atrocity ; the prosecution of others, 
including Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladić ; and the work of 
other courts, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, it must now be clear : those responsible for mass atrocities face 
a far greater risk that they will eventually be called to account for their actions.
This leads me to believe that the investigation, prosecution and conviction of perpetrators 
will serve to break the cycle of impunity and help deter the commission of future crimes 
– such is the objective and the hope. Nevertheless, prevention as an objective will be, as 
I have mentioned, difficult to measure and it will very likely be uneven in its achievement.
And still, it is worth the effort. Certainly, in is in that spirit that we work at the ICC – with 
the objective of bringing a measure of justice to victims and affected communities, and 
strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law.
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The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC pursues the goal of prevention through its own 
operations and by encouraging national responses to international crimes. The ability to 
deter crimes will depend upon the success with which the ICC does its work – and I put 
the focus especially upon the Office of the Prosecutor. We have to put setbacks behind 
us and build on the successes we are beginning to achieve.
This means that we must accomplish those actions over which we have control with the 
greatest possible skill and address, and manage as well as we are able, those many fac-
tors that are beyond our control but which impinge on our ability to operate effectively. 
Such factors include the willingness of States Parties to the Rome Statute and others to 
cooperate with us, behavior we can attempt to influence, but have very limited ability 
to compel ; the security situation on the ground, which presents risks we can manage, but 
cannot control ; and so on.
We can only strive to diminish disadvantages we encounter entering a situation, and to 
capitalize on opportunities we are able to generate. Successful investigation and pros-
ecution of Rome Statute crimes will be the most obvious and public vindication of the 
values the Court exists to support.
That said, the whole prevention effort goes well beyond investigation and prosecution, 
and includes the Preliminary Examination (an information-gathering process to determine 
issues of jurisdiction and admissibility). Because the ICC is a court of last resort (states 
have primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting Rome Statute crimes), one 
focus of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there are genuine national 
proceedings in existence that relate to substantially the same case we would bring. Only 
if national authorities have either proven unable or unwilling to exercise their jurisdiction 
can the ICC intervene in a situation. 
This need to determine whether genuine national proceedings have been undertaken 
relates to the concept of complementarity of jurisdictions that is a fundamental premise 
of the Rome Statute. We take what we call “a positive approach to complementarity” 
in that our jurisdiction is supposed to be complementary to national jurisdictions. Thus, 
at the preliminary examination stage, we often find ourselves encouraging national 
authorities to exercise their jurisdiction, and if they do, there is no need for the ICC to 
intervene.
There are many advantages to an effective local response to mass atrocity crimes : jus-
tice is delivered in the community where the crimes occurred, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights are strengthened at the national level, and the objectives of the Rome 
Statute system of international criminal justice are advanced. Furthermore, the commit-
ment of states to conduct investigations and prosecutions may itself signal a stronger 
commitment to the protection of human rights and the prevention of mass atrocities.
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(In a paper entitled “Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court”, avail-
able online Beth Simmons’ website at Harvard University, Simmons and Allison Danner 
suggest that adherence to the Rome Statute in and of itself may be a signal by a state 
that it is voluntarily abandoning the option of engaging in unlimited violence, so as to 
create incentives for other actors to alter their behavior as well.)
There is a belief in many quarters – on the part of civil society in situation countries, human 
rights NGOs, and even governments – that the mere presence of the ICC in a situa-
tion country through the preliminary examination process will have a preventive effect 
upon potential violence. Our own Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations highlights this 
“positive approach to complementarity” objective. 
An example of positive complementarity at work is Guinea. The authorities there are 
dealing with a politically motivated massacre and other crimes that occurred in Septem-
ber 2009. We have not intervened to investigate, but continue to keep a preliminary 
examination of the situation open, and this reinforces the ability of the Minister of Justice, 
I believe, to push forward with the cases as he wishes to do.
Another expressly stated objective of preliminary examinations is prevention. In this 
respect, the intention of the Office of the Prosecutor is to perform an early warning 
function, by reacting promptly to information it collects on upsurges in violence and by 
engaging with states, international organizations and NGOs to verify information about 
alleged crimes and encourage genuine national proceedings as a preventive measure.
The Prosecutor will occasionally issue public statements in connection with situation coun-
tries to caution against violence in the hope that the reminder about possible investigation 
and prosecution will serve to deter crimes.
There is research being conducted on the preventive impact of the ICC, but my sense of 
it is that opinion is divided on whether the Court is doing any good – and, in any event, 
it’s just too early to tell. Anecdotally, it has been said, for example, that the convictions 
for the use of child soldiers that the ICC Trial Chamber delivered in the Lubanga case, 
arising out of the armed conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 
influenced the mass demobilization of child soldiers in faraway Nepal.
On a panel in Switzerland last year, a Member of Parliament from the DRC related 
that this ICC decision had heightened awareness about the problem of the use of child 
soldiers in the country and he was adamant that it had had a deterrent effect on the 
ground.
Recently, there have been some transitions in power, the relative peacefulness of which 
some say may have been due to the involvement, or potential involvement, of the ICC. 
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Was the involvement of the ICC in Kenya a factor in the peaceful elections of 2013 ? 
Did the possibility that political leaders who instigated electoral violence might be held 
accountable influence reactions to the results of a closely fought election ? Or did the 
coalition of two political groupings that were previously opposed – sometimes violently 
so – explain the peaceful election ? It is perhaps worth noting that the results of that 
election were challenged by the opposition, but there was no descent into the street – 
the challenge was made in court and the decision of the court in Kenya was accepted.
Did potential involvement of the ICC explain the relatively peaceful transition of power 
in Burkina Faso recently ? No one can really say in any of the situations.
There is, of course, the wonderful story reported in the New Yorker magazine about 
Christian militiamen in Central African Republic releasing Muslims they were abducting 
when a nun told the militiamen that the Muslims were under the protection of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court and, if any harm came to them, the militiamen would be arrested 
and taken to the Hague.
Such anecdotal evidence offers encouragement respecting the ability of the ICC to have 
a preventive impact. The challenge, of course, is far greater than one such incident, even 
if the outcome there was a happy one.
Positive results will generate credibility for both the Prosecutor and the ICC itself. Cred-
ibility, based on solid achievements, will allow the Court to have a greater deterrent 
impact, in my view. We are seeking to achieve these outcomes in a variety of ways, by 
building better understanding about the Court and its processes, securing better coop-
eration from States Parties and others, diversifying our evidence collection, subjecting 
our cases to rigorous internal review so that we present cogent cases that are supported 
by the evidence and are well thought through legally, engaging in strategic planning 
in a realistic and pragmatic way, and securing the resources we require to meet the 
demands placed upon us. 
In an often volatile, violent and dangerous world, the ICC offers the promise of an 
independent, impartial and fair administration of international criminal justice. The abil-
ity of international criminal justice to prevent the occurrence of mass atrocities will be 
imperfect. Reducing mass atrocities, if this can ever be achieved, may be due, as I have 
said, to factors other than the punishment of perpetrators, such as the development of 
inclusive political institutions, economic development, and the enhancement of a culture 
of respect for basic human rights.
Nonetheless, in the effort to end impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, the application of international criminal law will have a vital role to play in the 
matter of prevention.
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Picking up from James Stewart’s provocative position on the role of the ICC as an agent 
of deterrence, our discussion began with a number of participants asking the presenters 
to elaborate on this issue. Our conversation began with a consideration of whether or 
not normative pluralism can undermine deterrence.
One respondent indicated that the real question here was not the theoretical challenge 
of pluralism, but the actual effectiveness of the rule of law. This, he believed, is in part 
tied to the development of legal norms and their broader acceptance in society through 
a process he referred to as “social learning.” In the end, “If the norm lacks reality then 
legitimacy is undermined and capacity is diminished.”
On a more practical level, a number of discussants suggested we should make a distinc-
tion between the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC because in the case of the latter comple-
mentarity was a negotiated product of the Rome Statute. According to one speaker, 
the ad hoc tribunals needed primacy over national courts. “In Rwanda it was clear that 
the Rwandan government had no interest in yielding to the ICTR [International Criminal 
Tribunal in Rwanda], they wanted to do it all domestically. But they didn’t, nor would 
they have, surrendered the death penalty without primacy. Similarly, complementarity 
(without primacy) would have led to the ICTY defeat in former Yugoslavia.”
The conversation then turned to a number of specific cases. One speaker noted that in 
Kenya “Initially, I understand over 80 percent of the population in Kenya was in favor 
of the ICC. But the accused who came before the ICC were extremely successful at using 
nationalism and the memory of colonial atrocity and domination to turn the populace 
against the ICC.” He continued, noting that, although the Kenyan courts recognized 
that the ICC is part of the Kenyan legal system, this is not commonly referred to in the 
mass media, “rather they use the remoteness of the Court to turn people against it thus 
making it difficult to do effective work…I find a frightening tension between demands 
placed on [the ICC and] its our ability – especially resource-wise – to deliver… it does 
create challenges… “Working in any conflict situation is very difficult and this can be 
seen in the presumed lack of focus of the prosecution in Kenya.” There are other models. 
For example, the Special Court on Sierra Leone had a very aggressive outreach program 
built into its work and thus the court won a great deal of support. “We should not be 
afraid to get out there and talk about we are doing.”
Another speaker insisted that this was not always possible, arguing that “complementarity 
must also be understood in terms of nationalism – primacy to a national judicial process 
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often results in minimal punishment or releases the criminal altogether.” His other con-
cern was that real perpetrators often act with impunity because they know they will 
not be pursued. As an example he invoked the case of William Calley (for the My Lai 
Massacre), which took place in the midst of the Vietnam War. Although guilty of killing 
22 civilians, he was celebrated in the US and served only three years under house ar-
rest before being pardoned by President Nixon. In short, “nationalism is too strong for 
complementarity to be a positive contribution.”
The same speaker also criticized Israel’s “pseudo investigations and prosecution in the 
name of complementarity,” arguing that, “complementarity is part of liberal legality – it 
allows for acceptable dissent to obfuscate what the real distribution of power is in the 
world.”
“Complementarity is part of  liberal legality – it allows for acceptable 
dissent to obfuscate what the real distribution of  power is in the world”
— discussion participant
Others sought to rescue complementarity, either because it reflects the real-world con-
text in which international criminal law functions and may in some cases be productive, 
or because in specific cases both the Criminal Tribunals and the ICC have had positive 
impacts on judiciaries at the national level. Among the examples given were the work of 
the ICTR, which helped improve judicial processes in Rwanda, influenced the elimination 
of the death penalty, and helped “build capacity” to the extent that many of its cases 
were transferred to domestic courts. He also believed that the mere threat of intervention 
had spurred the domestic proceedings in Guinea and Columbia.
The same speaker suggested that the record in Kenya was not entirely dismal. Here the 
ICC was greatly assisted by the Waki Commission, which gave information and legiti-
macy to the ICC so that it may take up cases against involved politicians. While it is true 
that after the rise of William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta the ICC was blocked, local civil 
society attacked, local processes stalled or rolled back, and jurists stifled, this did not 
entirely negate the work of the court. According to this speaker “we are beginning to 
learn some very important lessons from Kenya. We need to be clearer about what we 
are doing. We have an outreach problem. Nationalism was mobilized to exacerbate 
the distance and thus delegitimize. The Ruto case doesn’t seem to attract the same elec-
tricity as the Kenyatta case – we don’t necessarily steal oxygen from civil society, but 
supply oxygen to it. To be effective you need to trust and you need to work with state 
mechanisms, culture and politics.” 
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Continuing, this speaker also suggested that the legacy of the ICC in Uganda was also 
more ambiguous than some suggest. The crux of the debate is whether the ICC inter-
rupted or undermined local justice processes in the north (including amnesty programs, 
which some saw as productive), whereas others say that the ICC brought attention and 
funding to local and traditional judicial practices.
Elaborating on this theme, one speaker brought up the role the ICC plays in supporting 
non-government actors. “It’s important to human rights activists in the world to know they 
are not alone – the way they turn to the ICC provides examples – the fact that people 
turn to the ICC as an ideal may influence how people think about human rights. The ICC 
can be a moral force and can be pedagogical.”
Another speaker was less sanguine about civil society groups, noting that one sees 
enormous variability in their roles and actions. In Chile, for example, civil society organi-
zations played a significant role in making leaders criminally accountable for atrocities. 
In these situations “civil society is an active ally. But if there is a situation, like in Sudan, 
where the leader for all his criminality continues to enjoy support of established powers 
in the country, then nationalism precludes civil society.” This in turn obviates the possibility 
that the ICC will have an impact in those contexts.
Complicating these issues further, another speaker insisted that we distinguish between 
“laws created on paper and that which arises from political and social mobilization.” 
He offered the torture debate in the US and the diversity of political and legal actors 
working together on these issues as an example.
This seemed to serve as a reminder of dynamic civil society groups advancing a human 
rights agenda that affirmed the value of complementarity, leading to another participant 
to recall Dr. Arbour’s intervention in 1999 : “Now that all NATO members subjected 
themselves voluntarily to primacy of the ICTY, none seem to have any objections to 
submitting themselves to the complementarity of the ICC.” In other words, the ICTY led 
the way for the ICC and thus a rethinking of the relationship between nationalism and 
international criminal justice. 
This speaker offered two specific examples : one is the decision of the ICC to reopen 
the investigation of the situation in Iraq, including over UK nationals regarding detainee 
abuse. In response, there have been changes in the British investigation, which appar-
ently has more investigators (non-military) than all of the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor. 
Through this investigation they have found thousands of incidents of alleged abuse. If the 
UK takes this seriously and does a national process, that is a great contribution – and 
one that only came because of the ICC announcement to look into the issue. Second, 
Israel does not want to be taken to the ICC. That is why they established an independent 
I n t e r n a t I o n a l  c r I m I n a l  J u s t I c e28
p a n e l  I
fact-finding commission. It may or may not work and may or may not be genuine, but 
the possibility is encouraging.
Our final speaker was not convinced that this is a bellwether moment. “This all sounds 
good – but are they pacifying the possibility of international justice or are they rendering 
an appropriate response ? The devil is in the detail… We must look not only at what the 
ICC is doing but what it is not doing.”
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Diane Orentlicher, “The Impact of the ICTY on Domestic Prosecutions in Bosnia 
and Serbia” 
Bridget Marchesi, “International Criminal Justice : Recent Empirical Studies on 
the Impact of Justice Mechanisms on Human Rights and Conflict” (paper by 
Marchesi and Kathryn Sikkink)
Izabela Steflja, “Lessons from Yugoslavia and Rwanda : How International 
Criminal Tribunals Can Empower Anti-Reform Forces”
Overview : This panel offered three striking examples of the varied forums through which 
victims of mass atrocities have pursued justice. In the three presentations and the discussions 
we were asked to consider not just the formal practices of the prosecutors, but the way 
those actions intersected with a variety of groups pursuing distinct justice agendas. Prof. 
Orentlicher examined  in detail how a human rights  system can evolve  through ongoing 
processes of mobilization and supranational prosecutions, and reminded the participants 
that ICTs, although operating outside of domestic settings, can stimulate transitional justice 
programs in ways that were unforeseen when the ICTY was created. Aside from providing 
important and encouraging insights into the overall effects of transitional justice for human 
rights, Ms. Marchesi’s presentation reminded us that the effects of transitional justice shift 
significantly over time. She also brought us back to the question of complementarity, insisting 
that the future of international criminal justice will depend on both formal complementarity 
and unintended complementarity. By contrast, Dr. Steflja’s findings in the former Yugoslavia 
and  Rwanda  reminded  participants  that  ICTs  can  inadvertently  undermine  political  and 
democratic reform – at least in the short term. She argued that at the very least we should 
not assume a positive relationship between ICTs and democratic consolidation.
Diane Orentlicher began this panel with a presentation that sought to shift our focus to 
practice at the local level. Her work on the ICTY considers what people in the former 
Yugoslavia who support the ICTY originally hoped it would achieve, and their own 
assessments of the degree to which their expectations were realized. Based on inter-
views with Bosniaks, Serbians and Croats (in Bosnia and Serbia, respectively), Prof. 
Orentlicher found that one of the most significant positive effects of the Tribunal was 
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an unintended one : the creation of domestic war crimes institutions. Her presentation is 
excerpted below.
My remarks draw upon on a book I am writing, which explores the impact of the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the two countries most 
affected by its work, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. To assess impact, one must of 
course first determine what criteria or benchmarks will be used. In this regard my own 
work has taken as its starting point the hopes and expectations of citizens of Serbia and 
Bosnia, so I will begin by noting several dimensions of “impact” individuals from these 
countries hoped would result from the Tribunal’s work, as expressed during interviews I 
conducted in Bosnia and Serbia over an eight-year period, as well as their perceptions 
of how well their hopes have been fulfilled. I will devote the rest of my remarks to the 
ICTY’s impact in one sphere – stimulating domestic prosecutions of wartime atrocities – 
because I believe this aspect of the Tribunal’s experience offers particularly instructive 
lessons for the further development of international justice.
“Grafting international procedures and law wholesale into domestic 
law can compound a post-conflict society’s challenges and diminish local 
communities’ sense of  ownership” — Diane Orentlicher
Among Bosnians I have interviewed – and here, I will focus on the views of Bosniaks 
in particular – by far the most important goal they said they hoped the ICTY would 
achieve was providing justice for its own sake. Measured against their original hopes, 
most Bosnians are immensely disappointed in both the quality and quantity of justice 
that has been dispensed in the Hague. In their view, the ICTY’s sentences are too short ; 
the Tribunal has prosecuted too few defendants ; proceedings in the Hague are too 
complex and take far too long ; ICTY judges have done a poor job controlling several 
high-profile defendants, who have transformed the courtroom into a platform for nation-
alist propaganda ; the ICTY’s work has not stimulated widespread acknowledgement 
of responsibility for wartime atrocities ; and some of the Tribunal’s judgments appear 
to be politically motivated. Yet every Bosniak I have interviewed has told me he or she 
was nonetheless glad the ICTY was created because without it, they are convinced, they 
would have received no justice at all. 
Beyond the promise of justice for its own sake, two other, interrelated, expectations were 
frequently mentioned in my interviews with Bosnians : first, that the ICTY’s judgments 
would lead members of other ethnic groups, including the political and social elite of 
those groups, to acknowledge the full extent of atrocities committed by members of their 
group and to condemn them without equivocation ; and second, that the Tribunal’s work 
would foster reconciliation among Bosnia’s major ethnic groups. On both of these counts, 
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Bosnians are hugely disappointed in what has transpired. Many Bosniaks in particular 
nonetheless attach great value to the wealth of facts and evidence generated by the 
ICTY, which they hope will lead to greater acknowledgment in the future and which, in 
the meantime, they value as validation of what so many victims endured.
“We raised the bar of  expectations too high. We must manage expectations 
about what a tribunal can and cannot do.” — Diane Orentlicher
Turning to Serbia, according to numerous opinion surveys the ICTY is deeply unpopular 
among most of the country’s citizens. But a sturdy minority has supported the Tribunal. 
Among the reasons for their support, the following loomed especially large in my inter-
views in Serbia. 
First, Serbians who support the ICTY hoped the Tribunal would prevent wholesale impunity 
for wartime atrocities – and for the most part my Serbian interlocutors believe the ICTY 
has achieved this goal. Their principal disappointments in this regard are that former 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević died before his marathon trial was completed, 
and that a series of controversial verdicts starting with a final judgment in November 
2012 exonerated several top suspects on grounds many perceive as politically motivated.
Second, many Serbian supporters of the ICTY believe that, by prosecuting senior Serbian 
officials like Slobodan Milošević, the Tribunal removed from the political landscape 
individuals who would have been an unbearable burden for the fragile, democratically 
elected government that succeeded Milošević. For those who assess international criminal 
tribunals primarily in terms of consequentialist criteria, this aspect of the ICTY’s record 
is noteworthy. 
Third, Serbian supporters of the ICTY told me they hoped the Tribunal’s work would spur 
their society to acknowledge that atrocities were committed in its name and to condemn 
them unequivocally. To these citizens’ profound disappointment, the Tribunal’s work has 
not dispelled widespread equivocation in Serbia’s public discourse about Serbs’ roles 
in wartime atrocities. Even so, many hope and believe the ICTY’s archives will provide a 
foundation for a more robust reckoning in the future.
Despite a litany of disappointments in the ICTY, in my interviews in both Serbia and Bos-
nia the ICTY received high marks for a contribution it was neither designed nor initially 
expected to make, but which now counts as one of its most important legacies. It spurred 
the creation of domestic war crimes institutions in countries of the former Yugoslavia, 
including Serbia and Bosnia. 
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In Bosnia, this came about for reasons of expediency rather than enlightened vision. 
Several years into its work, the ICTY came under mounting pressure to complete its work 
more efficiently, and its leaders concluded they could do this only by offloading some of 
their cases to domestic courts. But this could happen only if they had confidence in local 
courts’ capacity to render impartial justice in accordance with international standards. 
Focusing on Bosnia because the majority of wartime atrocities occurred there, ICTY 
officials concluded that its judiciary did not yet meet relevant standards, and engaged 
with other key actors to strengthen Bosnia’s domestic capacity. The result of these efforts 
was the establishment of a state-level war crimes chamber, which began operating 
ten years ago, and a special department for war crimes within the State Prosecutor’s 
office. International personnel participated in both, as well as in the court’s registry, for 
a transitional period. 
Although the ICTY’s efforts to develop a credible domestic partner focused on Bosnia, 
the Tribunal unintentionally helped spur the creation of a domestic war crimes chamber 
and a war crimes prosecutor’s office in Serbia, both of which began operating in 2003. 
This development was not solely a response to the ICTY ; crucial as well was the democratic 
transition in Serbia following the collapse of the Milošević regime. 
Even so, officials who served in the first post-Milošević government say the very existence 
of the ICTY provided crucial inspiration. In the words of one former official who was 
involved in creating the Serbian war crimes institutions, the post-Milošević government 
found the ICTY “very useful” in helping open a space for Serbia to deal with “the burden 
of war crimes in all its dimensions.” The Tribunal’s influence had a positive dimension – 
as the first president of Serbia’s war crimes chamber put it, Serbians learned from the 
Hague Tribunal “as an idea” – as well as a negative dimension : Serbians who otherwise 
had scant interest in prosecuting wartime atrocities far preferred to see their countrymen 
prosecuted domestically than before the much-reviled ICTY. While neither Bosnia’s nor 
Serbia’s war crimes institutions have performed flawlessly, they are widely seen as one 
of the ICTY’s most significant legacies in both countries.
With a view toward identifying lessons learned from these experiences, let me note a 
few respects in which the ICTY and the states that support it could have done an even 
better job stimulating sustainable improvements in domestic prosecutions in the Balkans, 
as well as elements of the models that emerged in Bosnia and Serbia that are worth 
emulating.
First, in retrospect it is clear that the international community waited too long to focus on 
strengthening Bosnia’s domestic judicial institutions, and one reason for this was donor 
states’ commitment to the ICTY. Second, I would suggest that the international community 
should not automatically assume that national war crimes laws work best when they copy 
wholesale provisions in the statute of an international tribunal or borrow uncritically from 
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such a tribunal’s jurisprudence. The experience in Bosnia provides a cautionary tale : 
Bosnian courts’ attempt to follow international jurisprudence with respect to sentencing 
ultimately led to significant problems involving retroactivity. Grafting the legal frame-
work governing an international court onto domestic law can compound the challenges 
already faced by many countries’ post-conflict judiciaries, and may also diminish local 
communities’ sense of ownership over their country’s process of establishing account-
ability. By equal measure, it is important to acknowledge that judges in both Bosnia and 
Serbia have found invaluable guidance in several aspects of ICTY jurisprudence, and 
the Bosnian chamber’s judges are proud that they have been able to contribute to the 
further elaboration of international humanitarian law, and not be solely on the receiving 
end of jurisprudence enunciated by international courts. 
Third, in countries that have faced grave challenges mounting independent war crimes 
trials, embedding domestic prosecutions in a credible, independent, and public moni-
toring process can play a vital role in ensuring the effectiveness of those proceedings, 
particularly when the monitoring process is linked to meaningful incentives. In Serbia, 
independent monitoring has been performed by a robust civil society organization, 
the Humanitarian Law Center (HLC), whose work has helped spur Serbia’s war crimes 
institutions to improve their performance.
In Bosnia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission 
performed a monitoring role on behalf of the ICTY prosecutor in respect of cases trans-
ferred from the Hague to Bosnia. Because the ICTY had the power to recall transferred 
cases, the OSCE monitoring process was particularly influential during the early years 
of the Bosnian war crimes chamber’s operation, when it focused on cases transferred 
from the Hague. More recently, with less robust monitoring processes in place, Bosnia’s 
war crimes institutions regressed in some respects. Starting three years ago, for example, 
those institutions adopted a practice of anonymizing verdicts and indictments, a practice 
that has more recently been corrected, at least in part. For victims, this was seen as per-
petuating a cycle of silence about the grievous crimes they endured.
A fourth lesson is relevant in situations where the international community may decide to 
support a national war crimes chamber and prosecution office that incorporate interna-
tional personnel for a transitional period, as happened in Bosnia. Bosnia’s experience 
suggests that it makes more sense to identify benchmarks that should be met before 
international personnel are fully withdrawn than to fully nationalize personnel in accor-
dance with a rigid, pre-set deadline. 
Turning to more affirmative lessons learned, the ICTY’s transfer of evidence to prosecu-
tors in Bosnia and Serbia provided an invaluable boost to their early prosecutions in 
particular, and it is important to anticipate and plan for similar evidence-sharing by the 
ICC. ICTY investigators gathered crucial evidence that simply would not be available to 
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Bosnian and Serbian prosecutors if they had not obtained it from the Hague Tribunal. 
While local conditions in some countries may not allow ICC prosecutors safely to share 
evidence with domestic prosecutors, the ICTY experience highlights the importance of 
developing and archiving evidence with a view to maximizing their eventual use in 
domestic proceedings. 
Sixth, although capacity-building initiatives form a tiny portion of the ICTY’s programmatic 
activities, the Tribunal has undertaken several initiatives that are worth emulating when 
feasible and appropriate in light of relevant local conditions. For example, in 2004 the 
ICTY prosecutor established a transition team to liaise with domestic prosecutors, and 
in 2009, with EU assistance, she established a liaison prosecutors’ program to enhance 
local prosecutors’ access to ICTY evidence while in residence at the Tribunal during six-
month rotations. In addition, in 2008 the ICTY established a project to bring interns from 
the former Yugoslavia to the Hague for six-month periods, followed by an internship 
in their home institutions. My impression is that the ICC’s own internship programs could 
be more robust with reliable funding – and the ICTY’s experience suggests this kind of 
program is an important investment in the future.
Finally, in situations where a country has experienced horrific atrocities on a massive 
scale and reached a point where it is feasible for its judiciary to mount credible pros-
ecutions, it is particularly important to encourage domestic prosecutors to : 1) develop 
an overarching prosecutorial strategy from the outset ; 2) communicate that strategy 
to the public in part with a view to managing expectations ; and 3) to stay on track 
in implementing the strategy. Otherwise, it is all too easy for local prosecutors to be 
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of potential cases and to focus on low-hanging fruit 
– cases against direct perpetrators – and frustrate the expectations of many victims.
Despite the limitations to which I have alluded, the process of devolving responsibility for 
justice from the ICTY to national courts has been, on the whole, a success story. Indeed, it 
was this process that moved Serbia and Bosnia’s post-conflict justice experience beyond 
the relatively passive experience of international justice into the more enduring space 
of transitional justice.
. . .
The second presenter on this panel was Bridget Marchesi, who for the past three years 
has been a core member of a team of researchers collecting new data on all interna-
tional, foreign and domestic human rights prosecutions as well as data on a multitude of 
other transitional justice processes. Her presentation is excerpted below.
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In the late 2000s, two scholars finished data projects focused on transitional justice. 
Kathryn Sikkink’s team collected data on international, foreign and domestic prosecutions 
and truth commissions. Sikkink authored The Justice Cascade : How Human Rights Pros-
ecutions Are Changing World Politics. Using her team’s data, she empirically shows the 
emergence and spread of the norm of individual criminal accountability and tests the 
impact of human rights prosecutions and truth commissions on physical integrity rights. 
She found that human rights prosecutions improve physical integrity rights under tran-
sitional and conflict conditions, and that truth commissions improve physical integrity 
rights. Leigh Payne and her team authored Justice  in  Balance :  Comparing  Processes, 
Weighing  Efficacy. They found that combinations of transitional justice mechanisms – 
domestic prosecutions, truth commissions, and amnesties – improve human rights. They 
also found that none of the mechanisms have a stand-alone effect – and perhaps the 
most surprising finding of all – that domestic criminal prosecutions and amnesties, when 
used together, have a positive impact on physical integrity rights.
In order to build a better database and resolve some of the different findings – which 
the teams hypothesized were the result of using different definitions, coding procedures 
and statistical approaches – the two teams the formed the Transitional Justice Research 
Collaborative, which over the last five 5 years has built the most comprehensive publically 
available database on transitional justice mechanisms in the world. 
For all mechanisms, they collected highly disaggregated and detailed data. So, for 
example, they collect data at the level of the trial, capturing data about the different 
phases of the judicial process, including court-level data. They also collect data at the 
level of the accused, data about individuals including their membership, their rank, 
charges and more. They also are counting things differently compared to the predecessor 
projects. For example, all of the well-known transitional justice data projects and empirical 
studies – including Post-Conflict Justice data – rely on binary counts for each country 
year. In the past, researchers asked if any trial started in a given country-year and 
coded a 1 for yes and a 0 for no. But hiding behind each one of those binary variables 
are literally hundreds of new human rights prosecutions. 
How do these innovations change what we know about human rights prosecutions ? 
Because we code both the process of prosecution – the indictment, the arrest… all the 
way through to verdicts, sentencing and appeals – we can test the impact of the judicial 
process and the impact of the sanction separately and together. We find that all pros-
ecutions – those with and without verdicts – positively impact physical integrity rights. 
We also find that when guilty verdicts are rendered, the magnitude of the impact is 
bigger. This finding suggests that in some cases – for example, when politically necessary 
to secure the peace – policymakers might be able to combine judicial processes with 
alternate sentencing or reduced sanctions. 
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Perhaps most relevant to this audience, these innovations allow us better to understand 
how a decentralized but interactive global system of accountability works. For example, 
using sophisticated statistical techniques, members of our research team show that ICC 
investigations increase the count of domestic prosecutions for a multitude of human rights 
crimes including those under the jurisdiction of the ICC but also other human rights crimes 
such as torture and rape. 
One of the significant results of this work simply lies in their ability to detail the extent of 
new international and transitional domestic criminal prosecutions during the democratic 
transitions.
Note: The blue line represents the count of new transitional domestic criminal prosecutions. The 
dashed yellow line is a smoothed trend line of the blue line. The orange line are new international 
criminal prosecutions.
Figure 1. Criminal Prosecutions, 1970–2010.
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The huge peak of international trials in the early 2000s is driven by prosecutions in East 
Timor and Sierra Leone, and ICTY cases. Another interesting and somewhat illuminating 
peak occurs in 2007 and 2008. The most recent peak of domestic criminal prosecutions 
is mainly driven by domestic prosecutions in the Congo and Argentina. Our data confirm 
what most people know – there are many domestic prosecutions in Argentina – and 
what most people have overlooked – domestic prosecutions are also taking place in 
unlikely and unexpected places. 
For new transitional domestic criminal prosecutions (DCP), almost half of prosecutions 
take place in the Americas. This is especially interesting because our data show that the 
vast majority of amnesties are also adopted in the Americas. Except in a few cases, like 
Brazil, amnesties have not been an insurmountable barrier to prosecutions. 
For new international prosecutions, there is much more activity in Asia than previously 
thought. Much of this is tied to East Timor, where we used three sources to triangulate 
data : Special Panels for Serious Crimes, Serious Crimes Unit, and War Crimes Study 
Center at UC-Berkeley. 
We collected data on over 80 new international criminal prosecutions in 2000–2010. 
These include only the 37 new international criminal prosecutions that occur in 2002–
2010, after East Timor was recognized as a sovereign state. Almost all trials in 2002–
2010 do not progress beyond indictment.
As for the larger findings, the team found that domestic prosecutions do improve physical 
integrity rights. The most significant impacts come with the sustained, consistent use of 
domestic prosecutions over time. There are really no effects in the short or immediate 
term. We can also distinguish between the effect of the process of prosecution – here 
operationalized as trials without verdicts – and the punishment – here operationalized 
as trials with verdicts and trials with guilty verdicts.
The team includes all prosecutions, amnesties, and truth commissions in our models, and 
our findings suggest that the justice cascade is not being neutralized by amnesty policies 
or an impunity cascade.
Just as important as what these processes do is what they do not do. This might be the 
one case in social science were a null finding is exciting ! Domestic and international 
prosecutions do not worsen physical integrity rights – in the short or the long term ; and 
domestic prosecutions actually improve physical integrity rights in the long-term. I’ll later 
discuss their impact on peace but it’s the same story. Domestic and international pros-
ecutions are not, as predicted by neo-realists, a destabilizing factor in the post-conflict 
period.
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Controlling for levels of violence and other relevant factors, two other researchers 
associated with the Collaborative, Geoff Dancy and Florencia Montal, have shown that 
African states under ICC investigation are more likely to prosecute state agents for past 
human rights abuses compared to other African states that are in conflict. They call this 
“unintended complementarity.” It is still unclear as to whether this has a preventative 
effect, but it certainly has a restorative effect. 
Dancy’s research in particular shows that international prosecutions do not have an 
impact on peace in the short term, but they do in the long term. Amnesties in turn have 
a positive effect in the short term, but not in the long term. Trials, however, show little 
positive effect in the short term but a notable effect in the long term. 
There are very mixed findings in the literature about the impact of transitional justice 
mechanisms on peace. The Justice Balance team shows that amnesties have positive 
impacts on peace. In contrast, the Post-Conflict Justice team shows that amnesties have 
negative impacts on peace. They find, instead, that prosecutions and restorative measures 
play a role in preventing conflict recurrence.
. . .
Izabela Steflja, the third presenter on this panel, offered a somewhat more troubling 
account of the experience of transitional justice in Rwanda and Serbia. Her presentation 
is excerpted below.
In this presentation I examine the assumed positive relationship between international 
criminal trials and democratic consolidation via rule of law, judicial independence, and 
diffusion of democratic norms. I do that by analyzing the relationship between interna-
tional criminal trials and key domestic factors – mainly, domestic politics and dominant 
discourses on the ground. In particular, the presentation looks at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Serbia and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) in Rwanda. The research was part of my dissertation fieldwork, which 
is now a book in progress and concerns on-the-ground perceptions of international crimi-
nal tribunals (ICTs). 
Understanding the complexities in the relationship between ICTs and democratization 
is important because in post-conflict countries where mass atrocities and mass viola-
tions of human rights occurred political transitions toward democracy are an additional 
objective to (and equally as important as) ending impunity. Prominent scholars in the 
field argue that promoting and strengthening democracy is a final goal of transitional 
justice institutions such as ICTs. In fact, in much of the literature there is an underlying 
assumption and a normative expectation that ICTs are supportive of democratization, 
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contributing to institution-building, assisting norm diffusion, and forging the basis for a 
democratic political order that respects and protects human rights. 
“Can courtrooms work as classrooms to teach democratic values ? ...The 
findings show that legal events do not, on their own, create democratic 
norms rather political and cultural contexts affect the perception of  legal 
events.” — Izabela Steflja
My data indicate that if we look at the relationship between ICTs and key domestic 
factors, dominant discourses and national politics, in the cases of Serbia and Rwanda 
we find that in certain ways ICTs can inadvertently empower anti-reform forces and 
discredit liberal democratic reformers.
The evidence comes from fieldwork that I conducted from 2010 to 2013, which was 
framed in comparative politics and qualitative methods and involved building up networks 
and adopting an ethnographic sensibility for the purpose of semi-structured interviews. 
My interviewees included a diverse set of local actors, such as community leaders and 
opinion makers ranging from university professors and civil society to military generals 
and political prisoners. 
The central argument is that ICTs interact with domestic perceptions and domestic politics 
in counterintuitive ways to produce unintended outcomes, including harming local attempts 
to advance human rights and democratization and empowering ultranationalist and 
authoritarian anti-reform forces. The comparison of the ICTY in Serbia and the ICTR in 
Rwanda allows us to address the scope of this argument. Data from two very different 
cases indicate that the outcomes were similar : the tribunals weakened the support for 
domestic pro-reform actors and strengthened nationalist and authoritarian actors when 
a tribunal allied with the opposition, the weaker faction in terms of control of power 
and security forces, in Serbia, as well as when a tribunal allied with the ruling, stronger, 
faction in Rwanda. 
The study draws attention to powerful discourses at the domestic level, mainly perceptions 
of injustice and lack of judicial independence, foreign intervention and meddling in 
politics, and selective global justice. I argue that these real grievances discredited and 
divided reformist coalitions and created the political space that nationalist and authori-
tarian factions seized, resulting in serious impediments to political transitions. 
First, my data suggest that skepticism about the independence of the ICTY and ICTR 
judiciaries was prevalent in Serbia and Rwanda, which is problematic as confidence in 
judicial independence is key in democratization processes. The ICTs failed to establish 
legitimacy in the eyes of domestic actors because justice was not localized. 
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Second, my data point to the fact that the perception of norm forcing by external actors 
was counterproductive, lessening support for domestic reforms that strengthen human 
rights norms and democratization by antagonizing political coalitions and instigating 
nationalist and authoritarian backlashes. 
Third, local populations argued that international trials were being carried out in a 
context where state sovereignty and interests of the most powerful states, rather than 
universal liberal institutionalist norms about the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
are the dominant forces shaping international institutions. For this reason, interviewees 
across political spectrums in both cases emphasized that international justice is unequal 
and unfair, and its selective character makes it not supportive of democratic values and 
a more just world order. 
In Serbia the ICTY process inspired resurgence in defensive nationalism and contributed 
to the split in the liberal democratic coalition, therefore disrupting attempts at democratic 
consolidation. While donor aid freezes and selective funding in civil society and media, 
as well as foreign policies such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, set the stage for 
defensive, anti-reform, anti-democratization sentiment, over its 20-year span the ICTY 
contributed to the elimination and marginalization of the most reformist actors. 
First, the tribunal inadvertently provided a propaganda platform for nationalist elites 
on trial in the Hague while at the same time failing to ensure an effective outreach cam-
paign. All of us here are familiar with the performances put on by Slobodan Milošević, 
Ratko Mladić, Vojislav Šešelj and others. My interviewees emphasized that the audience 
perceived the leaders on trial as victims of a plot where a single Serb was being pitted 
against the world and, even if they did not support that particular leader’s domestic 
and wartime agenda and did not adequately understand ICTY proceedings, they pre-
ferred to be in solidarity with a member of their nation over supporting the international 
community. Many of my interviewees agreed that in its attempt to ensure Šešelj’s right 
to defend himself, the ICTY failed to limit his freedom even in circumstances when he 
ridiculed judges, publicly exposed witnesses under protection, and destroyed the dignity 
of the court. This diminished the authority of the international court and transformed it 
from an instrument of the rule of law into a tool for defensive nationalism and ridicule.
Second, key international actors made cooperation with the ICTY a condition for foreign 
aid and EU membership which local actors perceived as blackmail, resulting in further 
popular support for extreme nationalists and reduced support for reformists. Instead of 
triggering a normative shift toward accountability and democratization, ICTY’s push for 
fast deliverance of alleged war criminals and political transition, combined with threats 
of international isolation and feelings of blackmail on the ground, meant that the ICTY 
was successful in obtaining the alleged war criminals but it also meant that the narrative 
I n t e r n a t I o n a l  c r I m I n a l  J u s t I c e 41
p a n e l  I I
which identified the ICT as an imperialist institution of selective justice prevailed among 
right-wing nationalists, many moderates, and left-wing post-colonialists.
Third, the demands of the ICTY threatened not only the political success but the safety 
of certain reformists, and antagonized reformist coalitions, leading to their break up. 
My interviewees in Serbia most often pointed to the negative impact the ICTY exerted on 
the reformist coalition between Serbia’s Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić and Yugoslavia’s 
President Vojislav Koštunica (because the two actors and their supporters did not agree 
on the delivery of Milošević), as well as the assassination of Zoran Djindjić in the aftermath 
of Slobodan Milošević’s delivery to the Hague.
This created a situation where pro-reform politicians wanted to cooperate with the ICTY 
in order to avoid marginalization from donors and the international community, but they 
were also concerned with a backlash from the electorate, which largely bought into the 
defensive narrative. These pro-reform domestic actors thus spent more time balancing 
the demands of the international community and the electorate than focusing on reforms 
required for the political transition.
My interviewees in Rwanda repeatedly expressed the belief that ICTR allied with Paul 
Kagame and his faction in the ruling party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), via American 
and British administrations. Their perception was based on the ICTR decision to try only 
one party to the conflict – extremists from the former regime – while failing to indict 
members of the ruling party. Such perceptions suggest that the ICTR inadvertently reaf-
firmed the Rwandan government’s narrative of the civil war and genocide. 
Interviewees on different sides of the political spectrum perceived the ICTR as an institution 
that acted out of Western guilt (for failing to prevent and stop the genocide) and gave 
international support and legitimacy to the new authoritarian regime, deterring and 
impairing opposition forces on the ground. This perceived failure of the ICTR did not only 
upset the families and friends of the Hutu who were the main victims of RPF crimes. My 
Tutsi interviewees who were in Rwanda before and during the 1990s, who were adults 
with established careers during the Habyarimana and the Kagame regimes and who 
survived the genocide, most often argued that the ICTR should have tried everyone ac-
cused of any war crime or crime against humanity. A professor who has lived in Rwanda 
his entire life, was 44 at the time of the genocide, and went to Arusha three times to testify 
against accused génocidaires was truly disappointed with ICTR’s decision not to try the 
RPF. He argued that justice “is not for a category of people, justice is for everyone. 
You cannot just deal with one side.” While ICTR’s relationship with the Rwandan regime 
contributed to the country’s political stability (because the tribunal helped eliminate 
political opposition), this relationship did not significantly alter the human rights record 
of the authoritarian government. Selective amnesty to the RPF was thus perceived as a 
dangerous route rather than a good foundation for justice and reconciliation. 
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My interviewees perceived the ICTR as part of a larger Western coalition of “Friends 
of the New Rwanda” – that is, post-genocide Rwanda led by Paul Kagame’s government 
and the RPF party. Among other actors, Friends of the New Rwanda include Bill Clinton 
and Tony Blair (and the American and British administrations more generally). Sentiments 
such as “the ICTR is being run by the invisible hand of the US and the UK who feel 
ashamed for not helping when they should have” were common among interviewees 
(Interview, December 14, 2011). Thus, similar to my findings in Serbia, my interviewees 
in Rwanda did not perceive the ICT to be an independent institution grounded in judicial 
independence and the rule of law, which diminished the tribunal’s function as a founda-
tional pillar in Rwanda’s efforts to democratize. 
The comparison of the empirical findings in Serbia and Rwanda allowed me to examine 
cases where the relationship between international efforts and domestic actors was 
strikingly different, yet there were certain negative effects on democratic transitions in 
both countries. 
Simply put, in certain and significant ways, international criminal trials may not support 
democratic transition, at least not in the short term. Thus, we should not assume that 
there is a positive relationship ; instead we should turn to sound empirical research on 
this subject. The broader take-home lesson is that how international justice affects the 
domestic balance of powers may contribute to peace and democratic consolidation but 
may also result in resurgence of interethnic grievances and authoritarianism, with serious 
implications for political transitions in post-conflict societies.
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The discussion began with several speakers focusing on the issue of amnesties, in par-
ticularly picking up on Ms. Marchesi’s earlier finding that amnesties are correlated with 
long-term improvements in civil and political rights and under some conditions can play 
a role in long-term peace. [Editor’s note : Marchesi emphasizes that amnesties are never 
correlated with improvements in human rights. They do, however, play a role in build-
ing and keeping bargains, which is needed for democratic development and peace.] 
Several speakers agreed that the impact that amnesties have needed considerable 
research – both in terms of the nature of different types of amnesties and their specific 
long and short term effects.
Several speakers also picked up on the issue of time-frame, given that all three papers 
indicated that the impacts of the ICTs need to be measured in both immediate results 
and the long-term impacts, and that the differences in the papers suggested that there 
was no clear and single long-term impact. This prompted one participant to suggest that 
it was too soon to assess the impact of the ICTY.
The panelists did not agree that it was too early to assess the ICTs. Several indicated 
that short-run impacts were in fact critical, and that the ways in which the work of the 
ICTY were linked to political and social processes need to be understood. One panelist 
also suggested that “there are striking parallels between attitudes of Germans right 
after Nuremburg and the Serbs after the ICTY began operating.” Some noted that there 
is a difference between the reaction to the institution of Nuremburg and the norms of 
Nuremberg. While one presenter suggested that Djindjić was assassinated because of 
his cooperation with the ICTY, another noted that there was a broader context for his 
assassination – Djindjić was cracking down on organized crime.
The discussion then turned to a question about the extent to which satisfaction with the 
ICTs or lack thereof are a result of people having unrealistic hopes, or alternatively, was 
this the product of an ambiguous mandate or ambitious goals. 
One panelist thought it was a combination of both, saying “Yes. We raised the bar too 
high. We must manage expectations about what a tribunal can and cannot do.” As to 
the rhetoric of transitional justice/international justice raising expectations, she provided 
a detailed explanation : “Part of disappointment in victims was due to goals and ex-
pectations set too high by internationals and other ITC supporters… the ICTY started 
prosecuting lower-level people, so local populations thought the ICTY would prosecute 
everyone who is guilty, but, in the end, that wasn’t possible.” This speaker added that 
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justice is seen differently in different contexts, thus “in Bosnia, people really want criminal 
justice,” whereas other societies have different demands. 
The panelists also noted that a great deal of misinformation circulated in these settings 
about the precise responsibilities of the ICTs – their scope, powers, and mandate, some-
times out of ignorance and sometimes out of malice – and called for more research on 
this specific subject. One suggested that “social science methods can reveal that differ-
ent processes regulate different things ; they can disaggregate some of the data. For 
example, showing that trials seem to improve physical integrity rights but not political 
and civil rights.” 
Several participants agreed with this suggestion, but others also believed a much larger 
implication of these presentations lay in reconsidering the mandates and powers of the 
ICTs. Some indicated that by their very design they were deeply flawed from the start, 
while others pointed out that there were profound communication issues. Potential allies 
were not adequately cultivated, and either a lack of information or conscious distortions 
played a significant role in undermining the work of ICTs, particularly because of their 
perceived impositions on national sovereignty.
Our final commentator offered some specific insights to close the discussion. While 
agreeing that the ICTY did in fact engage in norm coercion, she argued that it played 
an absolutely critical role as an “international” institution, as local institutions simply had 
no ability to avoid mistrust at the time the ICTY was created. Another important consid-
eration is “the realities of time frames.” Although the local appetite for justice “is huge, 
it often has to be delayed for it to happen at all.”
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Rex Brynen, “The Politics of Palestinian Accession to the ICC” 
William Schabas, “Victors’ Justice and Double Standards : The Politics 
of International Justice” 
Ali A. Rizvi, “From Root Causes to Reform : The Challenges of Ushering  
Islam into the 21st Century”
Overview : These presentations offered much insight into the complex challenges of applying 
the principles of  international criminal accountability  in highly polarized and politicized 
settings. Rex Brynen suggested that in spite of the political motivations of the Palestinian 
state,  accession  to  the  ICC  could  have  important  and  in  some ways  unintended  conse-
quences. William Schabas concurred, and instead of warning against the dangers of the 
ICC intervening in the Gaza crisis suggested that a full-throttled approach could be a path 
to much greater global legitimacy for the ICC. Ali Rizvi complicated these matters further, 
reminding us of the challenges and opportunities for human rights within highly repressive 
societies where such concepts are often derided by powerful actors as foreign impositions.
Rex Brynen began this panel with a presentation on the issue of Palestine and the ICC. 
According to Prof. Brynen, Palestinians have all but given up hope on direct negotiations 
or US-backed negotiations with Israel, an assumption validated by the re-election of 
Benjamin Netanyahu. This in part informs the efforts by representatives of the Palestinian 
state to secure accession to the ICC. 
Palestine gained observer status at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2014, and 
on April 1, 2015, it formally became the newest state party to the ICC treaty. Palestine 
“accidentally” joined UNESCO but by and large they have avoided joining international 
organizations, and have tried to avoid this kind of conflict. In this case, they have decided 
there is no alternative.
According to Brynen, the Palestinian Authority (PA) is arguably “trying to use the ICC as 
an instrument of conflict resolution rather than accountability.” Because of “the profound 
frustration on the side of the Palestinian Authority to try and change Israel’s behavior, 
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Palestinians are strategically committed to using the ICC.” Palestine has two goals : 1) to 
change Israel’s military conduct and 2) to cease the ongoing transfer of population of 
Israel (there are three times more Israelis in the Occupied Territories since the peace 
process began in 1990s).
Prof. Brynen also indicated that accession to the ICC may be linked to PA leader 
Mahmoud Abbas’s efforts to discredit Hamas, but said this interpretation was complicated 
by the fact that Hamas itself has to approve the decision of Palestine to join the ICC. 
Although he offered no firm conclusions about Abbas’ motivations, he did suggest that 
the PA leadership might have underestimated the implications of the Rome Statute and 
their own culpability, or that they believed they would be protected by the principle of 
proportionality.
“What are the pre-existing structural conditions ? What are the framing 
effects ? What people think about international tribunals is affected not 
only by international tribunals but rather lots of  other conditions. There are 
genuine tensions !” — Rex Brynen
There have been significant political and economic consequences as a result of the ICC 
referral, such as “unprecedented economic coercion and Palestinian Authority public 
employees getting only 40 percent of their salary,” according to Brynen. He noted that 
this is quite worrisome and “could be a model of trying to prevent even Rome Statute 
signatories from pursuing global justice.” Israel’s response has been to attempt to dele-
gitimize the court and encourage a new wave of aggressive anti-ICC language in the 
US, argued Prof. Brynen. Western critics of the ICC on the Israel case will only add to 
the claims that the ICC practices selective justice. 
All of this, indicates Brynen, could provoke an internal political crisis down the road. 
While the ICC might gain greater international legitimacy for going after Israel (and 
not yet another African case), he fears that the court will become caught in a political 
quagmire if it indicts anyone in Israel. “I think all hell will break loose if the ICC gets past 
the point of investigation to indictment,” he argued.
 
These matters are complicated by the fact that in both the issue of the settlements and 
the actions of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), it is not the facts but the legality of the 
facts that are in dispute. Are the settlements a violation of international humanitarian 
law ? As for the IDF, given the care with which the force takes to avoid civilian casualties, 
and the fact that there are domestic processes in place to pursue atrocities, Prof. Brynen 
thought it highly unlikely that the fact pattern alone would lead to prosecutions.
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According to Brynen, the most sensitive issue is settlement. An ICC finding that Israel 
was in violation of international humanitarian law, when combined with the ICJ ruling 
and mass public opinion, would become a major global issue. “Settlement policy is 
incontrovertibly a violation of international humanitarian law… so if this is found to be 
a war crime the indictment would be of the prime minister himself.” [Editor’s note : the 
reference is to the ICJ’s July 2004 Advisory Opinion on Israel’s construction of a wall/
barrier around settlements on Occupied Palestinian Territory.] Prof. Brynen predicted 
that this would provoke great defensiveness on the part of Israel, which would point to 
double standards in the world of international criminal justice as a whole. Israel would 
argue that “there are a quarter million dead people in Syria and you are indicting us 
for building a playground outside Ramallah ?” Even worse, there could be an attack 
on the ICC as an existential threat to Jewish people and mobilization within the Jewish 
diaspora to defend itself. Again, Brynen pointed out that there was a lot of attention 
being paid to this issue in the US, and predicted that this political contest would over-
shadow all other ICC issues.
. . .
William Schabas picked up on a number of similar themes in his presentation. He began 
by explaining that he chose to use the term “victor’s justice” in the title to provoke and 
to underscore that one side was being prosecuted but the others were not. This form of 
selective prosecution “is a political decision… a decision by political creators of inter-
national military tribunals not to prosecute their own side.” According to Prof. Schabas, 
“we have lots of evidence that prosecutors at Nuremberg took instruction from their 
governments.” 
The same is true of the international criminal tribunals, which have always been political 
in the way they were established as well as in their methods, according to Schabas. 
The ICTY’s jurisdiction was also designated by political forces. The prosecutor was more 
independent, but selected by governments every four years and faced constraints. The 
ICC was supposed to be the perfect non-political court. But on what basis are decisions 
made ? Complementarity and gravity, two concepts that play an important role in the 
selection of cases at the ICC, are concepts that are often defined according to political 
criteria. In short, “there is a rhetoric of objectivity but that’s not true.” He offered two 
examples of inaction : the UK in Iraq, and [Israel in] Palestine. In both cases the first ICC 
prosecutor (Luis Ocampo) did not take up the case but the second prosecutor chose to 
take it up. Based on evidence from Wikileaks, “we know Ocampo told US officials that 
he wouldn’t pursue them in Iraq.” 
He continued : “I don’t like either of those decisions of the first prosecutor. The problem 
with the ICC is that when we look at situations, all seem justifiable, but when look at the 
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pattern it is unjustifiable.” According to Prof. Schabas, the pattern is political calculation 
embedded in a public denial of this fact. “The prosecutor should not be concerned with 
whether the people will be mad…I accept that there is an element of political judgment 
in all of this. We should not deny it, and just confront it…”
“The problem with ICC is that when we look at situations, all seem 
justifiable, but when we look at the pattern, it is unjustifiable.” 
— William Schabas
In calling for a direct engagement between the political realities of the Court and the 
Court’s place within the geopolitics of the world, Schabas argued that “the ICC shouldn’t 
be afraid of geopolitics but say ‘we’ve spent a decade going after the weak, and we 
should now try to take a bite out of the powerful.’” Echoing the concerns raised by Prof. 
Falk earlier in the day, he insisted : “Don’t be afraid of the hard cases – this is what will 
mobilize legitimacy. Justice for the powerful as well as the weak.” 
Turning his attention to the Palestinian case, he argued that there will be considerable 
resistance from the US and Israel should the Palestinian case be taken up by the ICC, 
but that the rest of the world will see it as a positive step. Global leaders will say “Ah, 
that’s the Court we’ve always wanted !” Such a move to confront geopolitical power will 
build legitimacy for the ICC.
By way of conclusion, Prof. Schabas offered an analogy to the ICJ. Its first contentious 
case, in 1949, led to the decision that the UK violated the sovereignty of Albania and 
this built legitimacy for the ICJ. During the following decade the ICJ was swamped with 
work, a trend that slowed only after it issued a judgment in support of South Africa and 
“all around the world states decided they couldn’t trust the ICJ, and courts decided they 
couldn’t trust ICJ.” Not until 1986 was this trend reversed, when the ICJ ruled against the 
US in favor of Nicaragua. “There needs to be trust in the court and then there will be 
legitimacy,” said Schabas. Once the teams on both sides trusted the court at ICJ “there 
was confidence that it is a fair court to get justice.”
“We’ve spent a decade going after the weak, and we should now try to 
take a bite out of  the powerful. Don’t be afraid of  the hard cases – this 
is what will mobilize legitimacy. Justice for the powerful as well as the 
weak.” — William Schabas
Concluding that this was a model for the ICC, he suggested that “the ICC has had a 
disappointing performance in its first decade, for a number of reasons. Now it’s not 
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sparking as it should…not dealing with burning issues of the day… I think that what will 
save it will be taking on some of these hard cases.”
. . .
The final presentation on this panel, by Ali Rizvi, took the discussion in a different direc-
tion. Dr. Rizvi offered a series of comments on the waves of violence in the Middle East 
that inform the larger concerns of the conference. His presentation is excerpted below.
I was raised in a Muslim family, in the Muslim cultures of three different countries – Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. I grew up in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a US ally with almost 
unconditional Western support, living there for close to twelve years. This land is the 
birthplace of Islam, its Prophet Muhammad, and its holy book, the Quran, elements that 
are revered universally by all 1.6 billion Muslims in the world, regardless of sect or de-
nomination. The monarch holds the title “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” referring 
to the two holiest sites in Islam, Mecca and Medina. It is the land that Muslims all over 
the world face when praying five times a day.
As I grew up there, I felt that something wasn’t right. To this day, Saudi Arabia carries 
out public beheadings. In Riyadh, this is done at a public square that we expatriates 
referred to as “Chop-Chop Square.” For perspective, in the same month that the world 
was reeling with shock at the beheading of James Foley at the hands of ISIS – August 
2014 – Saudi Arabia beheaded 19 people, including some for the crimes of sorcery 
and smuggling cannabis.
The Saudi government, claiming the Quran and Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet 
Muhammad) as its constitution, also amputates the limbs of those charged with theft. 
Religious minorities are not allowed to practice their religion. The women in the country 
suffer some of the most egregious human rights abuses of any in the world. They are 
banned from driving. They require the permission of a male guardian simply to work or 
travel. Victims of rape are often charged with fornication or adultery and sentenced to 
flogging if unable to produce four male witnesses to “prove” the crime. 
To my disappointment, I found endorsement for almost all of the Saudis’ actions in the 
Quran – the beheading of disbelievers in Verse 8 :12 ; the amputation of hands for theft 
in 5 :38 ; the practice of fighting Christians and Jews until they either convert or pay the 
jizyah tax – as ISIS does in Mosul, Iraq – in 9 :29-30 ; domestic violence in 4 :34 ; and so 
on. I was dismayed. When I asked my elders to explain this, they seemed just as taken 
aback as I did. As it turns out, very few of the moderate Muslims I knew had even read 
the holy book. That did not, however, stop them from trying their best to defend it. They 
would tell me not to read it “literally.” They questioned the authenticity of the translations, 
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despite being shown several of them. They would explain that the fundamentalists were 
misinterpreting it, or taking it “out of context,” yet were at a loss to explain what the 
correct interpretation or context was. They would insist that any inaccuracy or flaw was 
somehow a metaphor for something more palatable.
So, like many people living in the countries I grew up in, I lost my faith. I became an 
apostate. As many of you may know, this simple declaration – that I’ve changed my mind 
– is not one I could make in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan as easily as I just made it here. 
I saw my parents’ religion’s scripture being used to justify everything from child mar-
riages to the lashing of rape victims who could not produce four male witnesses to prove 
the crime. And the biggest victims of all this were Muslims themselves. It wasn’t just me 
– there were many like me who wanted to speak up about these issues – but couldn’t. I 
promised myself that when I was in a country where I had the freedom to speak, I would.
I arrived in North America permanently in my twenties. Two years after I settled in Toronto 
with my family, the September 11 attacks happened. Suddenly, the conversation I had 
been having with myself for years was out in the open. The Internet was now here, and 
soon enough, everyone had a voice. This is where I found myself caught between two 
narratives, neither of which I could relate to.
The first was driven by anti-Muslim bigotry, what I call the “Fox News narrative” : all 
Muslims were closet terrorist sympathizers, we must implement stricter immigration policies 
to keep them out, and we must profile people with brown skin. These brown-skinned 
people, of course, included myself and much of my family and friends – never mind that 
the underwear bomber was black, Jose Padilla was Hispanic, and the Boston bombers 
came from the Caucasus mountains, which is literally where the word “Caucasian” is 
derived from. Most of those spewing out this prejudice happened to be very religious, 
right-wing Christians and Jews, which didn’t give them much credibility in my eyes. I had 
read their books as well, and they didn’t seem much different from mine.
The second narrative, somewhat more disappointing to me personally, was from the lib-
eral left, which I consider myself in alignment with. This was the narrative of apologism, 
where any criticism of Islam was conflated with bigotry. Criticizing Islamic beliefs or the 
contents of the Quran would promptly earn one the label of “racist,” “Islamophobe,” 
and in my case, “sellout” or “Uncle Tom.” Many liberals also seemed to excuse the atroci-
ties committed in the name of Islam as some kind of reaction to Western imperialism or 
US foreign policy. Of course, they weren’t completely wrong – the causes of unrest in 
the Muslim world are complicated and varied – but I also knew first-hand that claiming 
these deeply held religious beliefs had nothing to do with the behavior they clearly 
engendered was disingenuous at best, and at worst gave cover to the fundamentalists, 
even if inadvertently. Fundamentalists in Muslim-majority countries thrive on this narrative. 
Often, it’s the only good thing they have going for them.
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This was my conflict – I wanted to be able to criticize Islam as one should be able to 
criticize any set of ideas – but I didn’t want to be seen to demonize an entire people – 
the people I was raised by and grew up with. Neither narrative made this distinction be-
tween ideas and people. It is crucial to emphasize the difference between the criticism 
of Islam and anti-Muslim bigotry : the first targets an ideology, and the second targets 
human beings. This is obviously a very significant difference, yet both are frequently 
lumped under the unfortunate umbrella term, “Islamophobia.” 
Here’s the thing : human beings have rights and are entitled to respect. Ideas, beliefs, 
and books don’t and aren’t. The right to believe what one wants to believe is sacred ; 
the beliefs themselves aren’t. If anything, it was precisely because of the horrific abuses 
I had witnessed ordinary Muslims suffer under theocratic policies and Sharia law that I 
wanted to start a dialogue to help shatter the taboo of criticizing religion.
Now, we’re not going to be able to resolve the problem of bringing about a reforma-
tion in the Muslim world in this 15-minute time slot. But my message to you is this : There 
are many, many out there with stories similar to mine. There is an alternative narrative 
reverberating within these Muslim-majority countries that is quite different from the one 
we get here after it’s been filtered through their state-endorsed blasphemy laws and 
speech restrictions. Unfortunately, we don’t hear them – because most are silenced before 
they get to us.
A lot of them identify as liberals, yet feel betrayed by their Western liberal counterparts, 
who, sometimes for fear of being seen as Islamophobic (what I call “Islamophobia-
phobia”) will overlook great illiberal injustices like the subjugation of women, or discrimi-
nation against gays, the moment they are endorsed in a holy book. Then, it’s hands off 
– because it is part of “their” religion, or “their” culture, which simply must be respected 
at all costs. “They” are held to a different standard – what is known as the soft bigotry 
of low expectations.
My good friend, Raif Badawi, is currently in a prison in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He has 
been sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment and 1,000 lashes, the first 50 of which he 
received in January, just three days before the Saudi ambassador to France attended 
the free speech rally in Paris after the Charlie Hebdo attacks. His crime, as many of you 
know, is blogging – the official charges were “adopting liberal thought,” “starting a 
liberal website,” and “insulting Islam.” Now, he is possibly facing death by beheading 
for apostasy. 
President Obama did not bring up Raif Badawi’s case in his last visit to Saudi Arabia. 
Prime Minister Harper – who has constantly been railing against the niqab and Islamist 
extremism – has been silent about Raif’s case despite the fact that his wife and children 
are living right here in Canada and campaigning tirelessly for his release.
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This isn’t an issue that will be solved militarily. Each time one militant group is defeated, 
another emerges that is even more brutal, exploiting a new set of grievances to expand 
its recruiting power. This is not a regional problem anymore, as evidenced by the Western 
passports held by thousands of ISIS members. This is also an ideological battle. We can 
keep trimming the branches, but there is an underlying ideology that has always been 
at the heart of it. We saw it two centuries ago in Jefferson’s Barbary wars. And we still 
see it today with ISIS.
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The discussion began with some speculation about the potential African responses to 
the Palestine/Israel question. Would Israel be able to capitalize on anti-ICC sentiment 
in Africa ? In addition to problems with US, Canada, Australia, would this not be very 
problematic ?
One commenter suggested that because the Court is in the UN system, we can assume a 
poisonous environment around Israel. It’s sui generis. It’s not like taking on the UK or the 
US. He said “I do not think that Israel is a good case to take because the consequences 
can be very severe even if it may be legally necessary. For that reason, the UK in Iraq 
may be a better situation – it would have a very visible effect on the wheels of justice 
opportunity.” 
Another sought to challenge both Schabas and Brynen on the issues of politics and 
the ICC, saying “it appears that the more one tries to be transparent, the more one is 
accused of hiding something.” The speaker reiterated that one of the ICC’s key consid-
erations in determining whether to take up a case is : “what is a reasonable prospect 
of conviction ?” According to this speaker, that is why Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda 
decided not to continue to prosecute Kenyatta, and in his estimation this is largely how 
case selection in the ICC worked. 
This speaker also insisted that, while “a lot of noise is made against the ICC in Africa, (it 
also) gets lots of support, though it is quieter.” He specifically noted Senegal. “There’s 
a lot more support in civil society and also among governments then one might think, 
when listening to certain state governments…” Other speakers reiterated that there is 
significant support for the ICC in Africa, particularly in cases where the Court provides 
clear information about atrocities.
From here, the discussion shifted to a focus on whether or not the Palestinians were in 
fact attempting to use the ICC to resolve the conflict with Israel. One speaker said that 
indeed, the Palestinians were hoping that an ICC decision on settlements could shift the 
paradigm away from the way it has been handled for the last 20 years – and that this 
is a strategic calculus. The use of the ICC is a strategy to put pressure on the normative 
justification of settlements politically. So although the facts of settlements are clear, the 
law is unclear. This differs with Gaza, where the intervention was much less clear but 
the law is clearer.
One participant raised the question of selectivity and whether or not it had stained the 
ICC. A panelist had the final word on this. “The cases come when the cases come. It’s not 
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possible to choose small cases now and big cases later. But it is important to note that 
for some people, the ICC is seen as the only institution to uphold international law – the 
only possibility for redress.” He laughed noting that, when the institution itself feels like 
it is crumbling, the hopes of these aggrieved people who believe that the ICC can bring 
justice, “may be comfort when bricks are falling on you.”
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Castro Wesamba, “Africa and Challenges of International Criminal Justice” 
Tim McCormack, “The Challenges of Applying Article 8 of the Rome Statute” 
Hyeran Jo and Beth A. Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter 
Atrocity ?” 
Sheri Rosenberg, “The Audacity of Hope : Mass Atrocities, International Justice 
and Prevention” 
Overview : This panel offered four different but quite positive assessments of the challenges 
and opportunities opened by the International Criminal Court. Castro Wesamba reminded 
participants that the ICC and ICTs have found significant constituencies in Africa, and are 
not simply viewed as external impositions on sovereignty. His comments were reinforced by 
the longitudinal study undertaken by Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons, which suggests these 
institutions have played a far stronger deterrent effect than most assume. Tim McCormack 
brought a close reading to Article 8, suggesting that some of the more challenging problems 
that the ICC has faced in terms of prosecutorial decisions could be resolved more easily 
than we might think. Last, Sheri Rosenberg reminded us of the important role that atrocity 
prevention should play in our deliberations, and suggested that a more robust, rather than 
a more cautious approach to these issues was merited.
The first panelist, Castro Wesamba, who spoke on behalf of the United Nations Special 
Office on the Prevention of Genocide, began by contextualizing the problem as he sees 
it. His remarks are excerpted below.
There is no doubt that the African continent has a long history of atrocity crimes – from 
the time of colonialism, through the periods of dictatorial regimes in one-party states, 
such as so-called Red Terror in Ethiopia, Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda in the 1970s and 
Sani Abacha’s brutal regime in Nigeria in the 1990s. 
The advent of multi-party politics in the 1990s ushered in new challenges, one of them 
being how to deal with a proliferation of armed non-state actors in many countries, mostly 
posing as rebel movements. These armed groups, acting independently or sometimes 
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with the complicity of the state, committed serious abuses of human rights, some of which 
could constitute atrocity crimes. This phenomenon has continued to pose a challenge. For 
example, we are all familiar with the crimes committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, 
commonly known as the LRA, in northern Uganda, as well as those committed by rebel 
movements in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the liberation movements and militia 
groups in the Sudan, among others.
Most notorious of the atrocities committed on the continent is of course the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide, in which over 800,000 people, mostly of them Tutsis, were exterminated. The 
effects of the Rwanda genocide are still being felt to today in the Great Lakes region, 
especially in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where rebel groups, 
militia and other armed elements continue to commit serious violations and abuses 
against the civilian population, including sexual violence against women and children.
For too long, the world simply looked the other way while generation after generation 
of Africans had their lives cut short by violence. Impunity for this violence has reigned 
on the continent, as authoritarian leaders and warlords killed without repercussions or 
accountability. Informed by this culture of impunity, ordinary Africans had to press their 
leadership to create institutions that would safeguard human rights, protect hard-won 
freedoms and deal with the dragon of impunity at regional and national levels.
At the continental level, African citizens were very critical of the Organization of African 
Unity, which was increasingly viewed as a club of some old folks who just met and chest-
thumped about everything and about nothing. The organization was not keeping up with 
the aspirations of the people on the continent. Africans could not just accept that they 
would continue to be brutalized and exploited by their own leadership without anyone 
on the continent lifting a finger and without recourse to justice.
Eventually, there was a paradigm shift on the continent from the Organization of African 
Unity’s position of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of its member states to a 
principle of “non-indifference” to the suffering of one another. This led to the creation 
of a successor organization to the Organization of African Unity – the African Union – 
whose aspirations are supposed to be driven by the people and not just by the political 
leaders on the continent.
This was followed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Gover-
nance, among others. These instruments are ground breaking in many ways. They not 
only reflect universal values already enshrined in various international instruments but 
they also demonstrate the willingness of African countries to reaffirm the right of African 
people to enjoy fundamental human rights and freedoms within the African setting.
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“The African Court on Human and People’s Rights not only reflects interna-
tional law but also the willingness of  Africa to address forms of  justice… 
This includes the right of  a state of  the African Union to intervene if  there 
are atrocity crimes against populations.” — Castro Wesamba
In fact, it can be observed that in 2000 the African Union was a pacesetter in codifying 
the obligation to prevent and protect populations from the serious crimes of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Later, at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, 
world leaders committed themselves to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This principle is commonly referred to as 
the Responsibility to Protect principle. 
The negotiations and eventual adoption of the Rome Statute establishing the Interna-
tional Criminal Court perhaps stand out as one of Africa’s major contributions to the 
development of international law and international criminal law in particular. Not only 
are the highest number of States Parties to the ICC from the African continent, but the 
continent continues to serve as a critical partner of the Court. 
Twelve years after the Rome Statute that established the Court came into force, all its 
investigations have been in Africa and all defendants in custody are African. This has 
led to the accusation against the ICC that it is biased against Africa. Although such an 
accusation does not bear scrutiny, it is easy to see why there is a perception of bias in 
light of the fact that all of the eight situations currently before the Court concern Africa. 
This perception poses, to some extent, a challenge to the progress that had been made 
so far in international criminal justice on the continent.
As one leading African scholar, Lyal Sunga, recently asked, “Has the ICC unfairly targeted 
Africa or has Africa unfairly targeted the ICC ?” 
On May 27, 2013, the African Union expressed its concern over what it referred to 
as the “misuse” of indictments against African leaders, while Ethiopia’s Prime Minister 
Hailemariam Desalegn accused ICC investigations of conducting some kind of “race-
hunting”. The African Union went ahead with the adoption of a declaration urging its 
members not to cooperate with the ICC until demands they had made were heeded, 
including the demands to drop charges against President Omar el Bashir of Sudan and 
to defer the cases against President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya and his deputy William 
Ruto.
In spite of the criticism of the ICC by some African leaders, the ongoing situations of 
serious violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law in the Central Afri-
can Republic, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan (Darfur, 
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Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile) are evidence of the challenges that the continent con-
tinues to confront. In fact, even after the African Union’s declaration on non-cooperation 
with the Court, we have seen requests by African states for investigations, including by 
the Central African Republic and Ivory Coast. This is a testimony both to the complex 
politics of the region and to a genuine commitment to international criminal justice.
At the same time as we support the work of the ICC, we continue to support the devel-
opment of appropriate national and regional mechanisms to investigate and prosecute 
serious crimes. Our Office has been working closely with the African Union’s first 
Commission of Inquiry, which was established last year to investigate the causes of the 
violence, serious violations and abuses as well as making recommendations on account-
ability, including criminal accountability in South Sudan. We have also been working 
with various partners to support the national authorities in the Central African Republic 
to establish judicial mechanisms to address the long-standing impunity there.
 If competent national, regional or international courts succeed in prosecuting individu-
als for the ongoing atrocities in this country, would the narrative that such prosecutions 
constitute a sort of conspiracy on the part of Western countries against Africans persist ?
My boss, Special Advisor Adama Dieng, has always posed the following question – and 
I quote : “We may take issue with the selective prosecution policy of the ICC, but… are 
we going to say that to avoid the judicial activism of the North we prefer to put up with 
the impunity of our criminals ?”
Would the suffering of a victim of mass rape in any part of Africa be lessened by 
knowing that women are being equally brutalized elsewhere in the world ? As the Chief 
Prosecutor of the ICC Fatou Bensouda pointed out, “You say that the ICC is targeting 
Africans, but all of the victims in our cases in Africa are African victims.” This is the reality 
that we cannot run away from.
In June 2014 at the 23rd Summit of the African Union, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 
the heads of State and Government significantly adopted an additional protocol to 
expand the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to include the 
crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (atrocity crimes) – which are 
part of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
They also went a step further and expanded the list of crimes beyond the four crimes 
that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Protocol covers an additional ten crimes 
that are of serious concern to the African continent, namely : Unconstitutional change of 
government ; Piracy ; Terrorism ; Mercenarism ; Corruption ; Money laundering ; Trafficking 
in person ; Trafficking in drugs, Trafficking in hazardous wastes ; and Illicit exploitation 
of natural resources.
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While many of us were outraged about what we saw as African leaders voting to protect 
themselves from prosecution by including language on immunity in the African Court 
protocol, we should acknowledge that they also broke new legal ground in international 
criminal justice by adopting a holistic approach to the prosecution of serious crimes. Of 
course, we cannot support immunity from prosecution of any perpetrator of atrocity 
crimes but, at the same time, it would be a mistake to turn our backs on those Africans 
who have worked very hard to see codification of these crimes and are committed to 
fight for justice on the continent because of the Article on immunity. Some observers on 
the continent who are closely associated with this process think that to do so would be 
like throwing out the baby with the bath water.
They have expressed optimism about the Court on several grounds. First, they argue that 
it will take time before the Protocol takes effect. At the moment, only three or four coun-
tries that have signed onto it. The protocol requires 12 signatories before it comes into 
effect. There are continued consultations on Article 41, the article that grants immunity 
to sitting heads of State and Government and other senior government officials. There 
is some hope that an amendment will be made to the article, particularly if we take into 
consideration the nature of the additional ten crimes covered by the Court – it would be 
almost unimaginable to protect from prosecution a senior government official suspected 
of terrorism, drug trafficking or money laundering. The inclusion of these additional 
crimes could provide the opportunity to amend the immunity clause in the protocol.
Second, the immunity clause violates international and national obligations. As a result, 
many national courts or legislative assemblies will find the Article inconsistent with domestic 
law and hence would not be able to implement the Protocol in its current form. And even 
if the immunity clause were applied, it would only provide immunity to those in office 
and would not stop any competent body or institution from investigating government 
officials after they have left office. 
Finally, in response to the criticism that such a court would undermine the ICC and the 
existing international legal regime, many legal scholars on the continent argue that the 
relationship between the African Court and the ICC is not necessarily conflictual. They 
argue that complementarity and judicial cooperation is well provided for in the protocol, 
including judicial cooperation with the ICC and the International Court of Justice.
But let us not be under any illusions that the African Court will be set up in the near future, 
anyway. Putting in place a credible criminal justice system is daunting task. It takes im-
mense resources, planning and organization, which the continent may not fully possess. 
The success of these institutions no doubt hinges on the support and collaboration of the 
international community. We all want to see Africa and Africans take responsibility for 
their issues. The mantra of “African solutions to African problems” sounds good to the 
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ear, but Africa cannot afford to exclude her international partners on this journey ; we 
have to continue our collaboration within the existing international framework.
On this basis, Special Adviser Adama Dieng has called on the international community 
several times, including in this forum, to nurture and support regional institutions created 
to further international law in Africa. Our Office strongly believes that it is only through 
empowering these institutions, submitting to their jurisdiction and respecting and carry-
ing out their decisions that they can meaningfully contribute to the articulation of their 
founding ideals. Empowering institutions like the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights and sub-regional courts will not only reaffirm the importance and role of interna-
tional law in Africa ; it will also demonstrate the commitment and belief of Africans to a 
global order based on justice, equality and respect of international human rights values.
. . .
The next presentation, by Tim McCormack, took a narrower approach to one of the 
critical problems faced by the ICC, the application of Article 8 of the Rome Statute (this 
is the Statute outlining War Crimes). Prof. McCormack asserted that that international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and war crimes are both bound by Article 8 and the ICC is bound 
by the terms of the statute and must always prove that a conflict is either an interna-
tional conflict or a non-international conflict. The two cases for intervention are laid out 
in the table below.
Table 1. Two Cases for Intervention, under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.
International armed Conflict non-International armed Conflict
Article 8 (2) (a) (1-8) 
Grave breaches of the Geneva Convention
Article 8 (2) (c) (1-4)
Severe violations of article 3 to the Geneva 
convention
Article 8 (2) (b) (1-26) 
Other severe violations of laws and customs 
applicable to international armed conflict
Article 8 (2) (e) (1 – 15)
Other severe violations of the law and  
customs of war applicable on non- 
international armed conflict
According to McCormick, the distinction between international and non-international 
armed conflicts is accepted by all parties and is codified under Article 8. The problem 
is that in the case of non-international conflicts, one can perpetrate substantial Human 
Rights Violations without violating Section 8 as long as these violations are inflicted in 
pursuit of legitimate military goals, while with international conflicts these violations can 
place a party in violation of Section 8 independent of military goals. 
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This creates uneven and unequal justice, noted McCormack, a problem that could be 
addressed through a variety of means. Article 8 2A/2C are treaty-bound, and thus 
virtually impossible to change. However, Articles 2B/2E could be collapsed, and adding 
to Article 2E to 2B would strengthen it and cover the 11 points that are not international-
specific and not already in 2B.
. . .
Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons’ presentation [delivered by Alexander Dawson] considered 
the deterrent power of the ICC, both in terms of prosecutorial deterrence and in terms of 
social deterrence. The former can include direct impacts (jurisdiction, indictments, investi-
gations, prosecutions do change perceptions of certainty) and indirect ones (complemen-
tarity). According to the authors there is general agreement that the ICC has produced 
some clear prosecutorial deterrence, impacting local prosecutions, state and non-state 
actors. There is also growing consensus in the deterrence literature that suggests that the 
swiftness and especially the likelihood of punishment may more effectively deter crime 
than severity of punishment. The paper thus focused on the socially deterrent aspects of 
the ICC.
The paper by Jo and Simmons, available in full online at the SSRN (Social Science 
Research Network), is excerpted below.
Few issues in international relations are more urgent than improving the life-chances for 
civilians who become pawns in civil war violence. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
international community has been groping toward a way to end impunity with respect 
to the worst human rights violations in intrastate conflicts. The tribunals in Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda were important milestones in this regard, but the most ambitious effort to 
date has been the International Criminal Court. Few institutions have inspired such high 
hopes, while stimulating so much controversy. Even though the Court has been operating 
for only 12 years, it is time to supplement anecdotal speculation with careful study of its 
effects. As realists Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner remind us, “ideals can be pursued 
effectively only if decision-makers are alert to...the consequences of their policies.”
This study is an attempt to at least address the “chasm between theory and practice” 
noted by ICC skeptics. First, we have been careful to specify exactly what it is we might 
expect the ICC to do : to deter a significant crime category within its jurisdiction. This is 
not the only consequence one might want to explore relating to the ICC, but it is one of 
its primary goals.
While the impact the court has had through prosecutorial deterrence seems relatively 
clear, the social deterrence produced by the ICC is less clear, largely because its impact 
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is exceedingly difficult to measure. Although the two phenomena are linked, social de-
terrence is more dynamic and likely has greater impact, in part because prosecutorial 
deterrence has relatively little effect on non-state actors, including rebels and secessionist 
groups. 
Using a cross-national dataset on civilian casualties in civil conflicts, we tested the effect 
on levels of violence of a range of country variables, such as : ratification of ICC or 
not ; in-country actions by the ICC ; strength of the rule of law ; and number of human 
rights organizations in operation. ICC Actions represent new information, available to 
all actors, demonstrating that the ICC is operational, authoritative, and that the prosecu-
tor means to take action. The ICC may have varying effects on different categories of 
actors, depending on their exposure to 1) the risk of prosecution and 2) the importance 
they attach – or the vulnerability they believe they have – to the social costs of criminal 
law violation.
Quite aside from its formal power to prosecute, the Court’s legal mandate signals the 
nature and strength of community norms. When community norms are challenged in 
a clear way (signaled for example by ICC actions or statements), there is significant 
potential for a social reaction to law violations.
The concept of social deterrence has largely been missing from accounts of how and 
why the ICC is a potentially powerful institution. This relative silence is ironic since one 
key purpose of the ICC is to set expectations, thereby placing some tactics outside the 
boundary of acceptable behavior. As the world’s first permanent and global criminal 
court, the ICC is especially central in defining international society’s response to inter-
national crimes.
We note that prosecutorial and social deterrence do not necessarily generate com-
pletely independent influences. Prosecutorial deterrence can shape social deterrence 
over time as investigations, arrests and convictions reinforce broadly shared values, 
which sharpens the focal power of an institution such as the ICC. Social deterrence is 
likely to be less tangible. Than prosecutorial deterrence. They theorize through a number 
of means, including those below.
Social deterrence has clearly been connected to an intensification in mobilization by 
human rights organizations (HROs). Increased pressure from HROs has been shown to 
decrease civilian killings by approximately two to eight deaths per year, or about a 
20-percent reduction in the violence level. This civil society effect is substantially magnified 
by the focal power and jurisdiction of the ICC : the slope for ratifying states is steeper 
and more negative than that of non-ratifying states. In states that ratify, adding one 
human rights organization is estimated to reduce intentional killing by between four 
and six 6 civilians. In states that do not ratify, the effect of increases in HROs is flat.
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The ICC has also been linked to new domestic crime statutes, which as we have shown 
are themselves influenced by the presence of the ICC, and are also associated with 
reduced civilian killing. We see a link to the development of a more robust Rule of Law, 
suggesting that it is not merely the capacity to enforce but substantive legal change that 
is critical to the result. One categorical shift toward stronger ICC-consistent domestic 
legal reform reduces civilian killing by about 60 percent. Knowing the ICC may step in 
where domestic institutions fail seems to have encouraged domestic legal change, which 
in turn helps to deter at least some intentional violence against civilians by government 
forces.
At the international level, social deterrence may also be supported through aid relation-
ships. Our results show that while aid itself is not systematically associated with a reduction 
of violence, governments that ratified the ICC Statute in fact were subsequently much 
more likely to reduce or to refrain from intentional civilian violence the more aid they 
received.
Increasing aid also reduces violence more in states that ratify the statutes. In contrast, 
without ratification, increasing aid does little to change the marginal effect on the civil-
ian killing count. We found no interactive effects between ratification and foreign trade 
relationships, possibly because trade is minor for many of these countries, does not 
clearly benefit government officials, and flows mostly from the decentralized decisions 
of private actors. If governments are socially deterred by extralegal material relation-
ships, the risk of losing aid appears to loom much larger than trade relations.
Importantly, when all the ICC-related variables as well as several alternative policy 
interventions are accounted for, social deterrence effects survive while prosecutorial 
deterrence effects are muted. This is largely because prosecutorial deterrence and social 
deterrence truly are mutually reinforcing. The effect of ICC Actions does not reach 
traditional significance levels in the full model, but recall that it is based on a restricted 
sample in order to deal with the endogenous effects of ratification. Since there is no 
reason to use the matched samples to test the effects of ICC Actions, and such actions 
are robustly associated with reduced civilian killing for all the countries in the sample 
before matching, we remain fairly confident that investigations, warrants and prosecutions 
help to deter government atrocities.
We have theorized two broad and mutually reinforcing channels of potential deter-
rence – prosecutorial and social deterrence – and specified the conditions under which 
we might expect them to hold. We have argued that the ICC contributes directly to 
prosecutorial deterrence by investigating and prosecuting war crimes on its own author-
ity. It also encourages member states to improve their capacity to reduce, detect and 
prosecute war crimes domestically, and indeed the evidence shows that ratifying states 
are much more likely than non-ratifiers to do so. There is strong evidence of a reduction 
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in intentional civilian killing by government actors when states implement ICC-consistent 
statutes in domestic criminal law which we can reasonably attribute, at least indirectly, 
to the ICC’s influence. Such domestic statutes magnify the ICC’s prosecutorial deterrent 
effect by bolstering it with the added possibility of punishment at home. Finally, it is 
critical to understand that legal rules interact with social pressures, both tangible and 
intangible. The ICC also deters because it mobilizes the international community as 
well as domestic civil society to demand justice. In this sense, our view of the ICC is fully 
consistent with broader trends in human rights prosecutions at the local, regional and 
global level.
We want to stress that our claims are modulated. Persons who intentionally terrorize 
civilians for their personal or political purposes are difficult to deter under any cir-
cumstances. But the ICC has raised the risks of consequences for violations, through the 
channels discussed above. We illustrate the plausibility of these channels but also dem-
onstrate their limits. Governments that depend on aid relationships are easier to deter 
than the more self-reliant. We also show that rebels are harder to deter than govern-
ments. Nonetheless, even rebels appear to have significantly reduced intentional civilian 
when the ICC has signaled its determination to prosecute. Debates over the effects of 
the ICC have been sterile, largely because they have failed to specify the conditions 
under which they might expect the Court to “work.”
“We need to address the chasm between theory and practice... We are 
not pushing the point that one prosecutor, acting alone and without 
significant backing by the international community or local support, could 
have brought about these consequences merely by issuing a decision to 
investigate or signing a warrant. ICC interventions are powerful because 
they are part of  a package of  efforts to rally support for ending impunity.”
— Hyeran Jo and Beth Simmons
It is also important to put our claims into perspective. We are not pushing the point that 
one prosecutor, acting alone and without significant backing by the international commu-
nity or local support, could have brought about these consequences merely by issuing a 
decision to investigate or signing a warrant. The ICC interventions are powerful because 
they are part of a package of efforts to rally support for ending impunity. Moreover, 
part of the package has taken time to unfold – a redoubling of domestic efforts to 
develop the legal capacity to prosecute war crimes, which is precisely how the ICC’s 
complementarity is intended to operate. The evidence suggests these efforts contributed 
to what we have analyzed as an indirect prosecutorial effect of the ICC itself, although 
only for government officials. But the evidence suggests that the ICC’s demonstrated 
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determination to investigate and issue warrants has contributed to the reduction of vio-
lence by convincing rebel leaders that impunity is a waning option.
At the same time we are under no illusions that the Court has positive impacts in all 
cases. The Bemba trial in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic did 
not stop violence by the Seleka faction, which reminds us that the Court cannot solve 
deep-rooted social problems in a short period of time. The Prosecutor prioritizes cases 
where violations are “grave” and these are precisely cases where violence is prone to 
recur. We therefore are analyzing some of the most protracted cases of conflict in the 
world – a fact that makes the modest positive consequences we document all the more 
remarkable.
The ICC had its ten-year anniversary in 2012. Many challenges are ahead. The Court 
has yet to gain consistent support from major powers like the US, China, India and Japan 
which would boost its resources and legitimacy. Although the ICC enjoys the support of 
121 countries, observers note that the Court faces many practical challenges in its day-
to-day operations, such as gathering evidence and conducting quality fact-finding. In 
many respects we agree. But its willingness to prosecute has contributed to perceptions 
that impunity for egregious war crimes is a diminishing option. The evidence suggests 
that this role has potential to save at least a few lives in some of the most violent settings 
in recent decades.
. . .
The panel’s final presentation was given by Sheri Rosenberg, who returned to the pre-
ventative power of international justice. Insisting that international criminal justice is only 
one part of atrocity prevention, Prof. Rosenberg suggested that there might be a way 
to mobilize the preventative aspects of R2P around “a consolidation of norms around 
prevention.” Although noting that skepticism about international criminal law develops 
at about the same rate as criminal law itself, she believed that the Office of the Prosecu-
tor should undertake more research into how it might act as part of a broader atrocity 
prevention agenda. 
According to Prof. Rosenberg, atrocity prevention is a multi-stakeholder process that is 
much broader than the criminal justice theories of deterrence, which tend to be simply 
cost-benefit analyses of individual perpetrators. The larger question is both how can 
atrocity prevention be measured, and how can international criminal justice contribute to 
atrocity prevention ? She continued, “We need to bifurcate deterrence and prevention. 
We must move from deterrence only to a broader understanding of atrocity prevention.” 
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In order to do this, scholars and prosecutors needed to both consider how a focus 
on atrocity prevention might narrowly affect specific prosecutorial strategies, and how 
international criminal justice as a whole could embrace atrocity prevention. Atrocity pre-
vention involves many more actors and theories than the narrow prosecutorial mandate 
of the ICC seems to allow. 
“We need to bifurcate deterrence and prevention. We must move from 
deterrence only to a broader understanding of  atrocity prevention.”
— Sheri Rosenberg
In an effort to move this dialogue forward, Prof. Rosenberg borrows from the expressiv-
ist theory of international criminal law to address atrocity crimes (which she reminded 
the participants were overwhelmingly identity-based). Expressivist legal theory asks 
us to imagine forms of international criminal law that can be strategically mobilized in 
specific contexts in order to enhance the value of equality. In order to do this we must 
examine the theoretical underpinnings of punishment in international and domestic law, 
and acknowledge that “there is an imperfect fit between international and national 
punishment theory.” Both recognize that deterrence is based on balancing a credible 
threat and severity of punishment but, according to Rosenberg, “the ICC lacks this. A 
rational actor is suspect in international context even more than a national context, and, 
in the case of atrocity crimes the collective nature of crimes – rather than individual – 
becomes an issue.”
Domestic law tends to focus on aberrant behavior whereas international law focuses 
on obedient behavior. What occurs with mass atrocities is that such atrocities become 
normalized, whereas crimes in national jurisdictions are aberrant from the norms of 
society. This inconsistency (characterized as fragmentation by Rosenberg) is one of the 
phenomena that has weakened the legitimacy of international criminal law. What ex-
pressivist theory offers is a focus on the constructivist socializing role played by laws, 
their capacity to create norms and foster new forms of socialization. 
Prof. Rosenberg implored the participants to test empirically some of these ideas, to 
contribute to a larger debate about the role that the ICC might play in atrocity prevention. 
Although acknowledging the resistance these ideas might face, she concluded that, just 
as many in the international community had embraced the Responsibility to Protect, it 
might be time to advance a Responsibility to Prosecute.
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The discussion began with a question about the relationship between the African Criminal 
Court (ACC) and the ICC, and particularly whether or not ACC might undermine the 
work of the ICC due to sovereign immunity. Our speakers were unsure of the full im-
plications (in part because negotiations are still ongoing), but noted that for those who 
ratified the Rome Statute, sovereign impunity is inconsistent with many domestic criminal 
laws in Africa. Moreover, within the African Criminal Court statute, only Article 41 is 
inconsistent with Rome Statute, making it very likely that many of those who support the 
ICC in Africa will still support the African Criminal Court with the understanding that 
Article 41 will be reformed at some point in the future. 
This evolved into a further consideration of the problems with Article 8 of the Rome Stat-
ute, as discussed by Prof. McCormack. Several individuals with experience in ICTs and 
the ICC indicated that prosecutors are hamstrung by the wording of Article 8, trying to 
parse its meanings on an almost daily basis. One said : “Why do I have to prove it is an 
international armed conflict ? Because of the very law in which it is written.”
Going further, the speaker argued that “law is about compliance, not coercion… evolution 
of norms… law moves at a glacial pace… It will take a century before we look back 
on this process.”
And yet in spite of these limitations the ICTs had produced significant results, including 
the guilty plea of Jean Kambanda, the Rwandan Prime Minister. The same speaker indi-
cated that the significance of the event was that “an insider of the system acknowledged 
his guilt within the parameters of the system. Of course it turned out to be a non-event, 
because it took five minutes.” This speaker conceded that larger goals were more elusive. 
“The early expectations of the ad hocs were ridiculous… including national reconcilia-
tion… we were overly ambitious – we were hoping for deterrence and national recon-
ciliation too. Really ? It was too much. It’s about calculating !”
Keeping with the theme of reconciliation, another speaker asked about the value of 
victim participation, especially given the amount of money it costs and the negligible 
impact. There was no clear answer to this question.
Finally, several speakers expressed both surprise and skepticism about the findings of 
Profs. Jo and Simmons, in part because of reservations they felt about relying too much 
on deterrence as a justification for the work of the ICC and other tribunals. As Jo and 
Simmons were not present to explain their paper further, Dr. Dawson indicated that the 
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larger work seemed to have produced a robust amount of data with striking results, and 
that the paper itself acknowledges that this represents a project that is not yet complete. 
Indeed, instead of offering sweeping theoretical claims, the work suggests that there is 
a great deal of concrete evidence out there that links changing social behavior by a 
variety of actors to the work of the ICTs and ICC, and that these sometimes subtle shifts 
in behavior need to be accounted for in any careful evaluation of the working and 
impact of international criminal justice.
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Jennifer Quaid, “The Next Frontier of International Criminal Law : Holding 
Organizations to Account as Distinct Responsible Actors” 
James Stewart (UBC), “Avenues of Accountability for the Most Egregious 
Corporate Offending in War Zones” 
Overview : The  two presentations on  this panel  introduced new venues  in which  interna-
tional criminal law seems increasingly relevant. Jennifer Quaid’s meditation on introducing 
organizational accountability recognized the significant challenges such an initiative faces, 
but made a forceful argument in favor of this as a new direction for prosecution. James 
Stewart offered concrete examples of how truly pressing this issue is, advocating a much 
more expansive reading of the mandate of the ICC than has heretofore been the case. 
Participants expressed enthusiasm for the values that informed both Quaid’s and Stewart’s 
presentations, with most of  the questions centering on  the difficulty  that  these  initiatives 
face in gaining buy-in in the Global North.
Jennifer Quaid picked up on the ambitious agenda outlined in Panel IV by Sheri Rosen-
berg, and moved the conversation in a new direction in her presentation on organizational 
accountability in international criminal law. Ms. Quaid, whose background is in corporate 
criminal liability, used her paper to consider how we might integrate organizations into 
international criminal law. Her presentation is excerpted below.
[Editor’s note : In Quaid’s written presentation she was able to make a much more exten-
sive argument about the implementation of her proposals. The excerpt below is based 
on the portions of the paper she was able to present at the conference.]
My initial intention was to focus my talk today on a different way of thinking about or-
ganizational responsibility – the subject of my on-going doctoral work – one which I be-
lieve holds organizations to account in a way that better connects to their fundamentally 
collective nature while still respecting the basic principles of criminal responsibility. Over 
the past months, as I have started to think about how my research could be applied to 
the international context, I ran into a number of preliminary questions that caused me to 
I n t e r n a t I o n a l  c r I m I n a l  J u s t I c e70
p a n e l  v
examine critically the points of intersection between organizations, criminal responsibility 
and international law. 
These questions, I discovered rapidly, were not only important to establishing a convinc-
ing foundation on which to present my ideas, they also raised important issues about 
the role of international criminal law and the directions the community of scholars and 
practitioners who work actively in this field may want to take when embarking on the 
path of organizational liability.
In my work, I study organizational criminal liability primarily as a form of personal ju-
risdiction. From among the labels that are commonly used, I prefer the term “organiza-
tional criminal liability” because this places the emphasis on how we apply the criminal 
liability to collective entities, regardless of legal form. I believe it is keenly important to 
tie organizational accountability under the criminal law to the attributes of organiza-
tions. This being said, I should stress that focusing on the characteristics of organizations 
as a way of identifying who is a subject of criminal law, does have a bearing on how we 
might think about subject matter jurisdiction within organizational criminal law liability. 
By this, I mean that having a sense of who – or what – is the organization necessarily 
shapes our view of the kind of blameworthy conduct the organization is capable of 
engaging in. This affords the opportunity of framing blameworthy conduct differently, 
i.e., an organizational way, which opens the door to uniquely organizational forms of 
misconduct (such as grossly negligent or willfully mismanaged systems). 
References to corporate criminal liability are directed, for the most part, at the activities 
of large commercial organizations. As such, any discussion of extending liability to these 
entities should be focused on their collective nature, as this is the characteristic that dis-
tinguishes them from individuals and is the main driver for this basis of liability. Although 
it has been challenging for scholars to develop theoretical frameworks to support a 
truly organization view of liability, I believe that on the ground, most people understand 
intuitively that organizations have the potential for greater good and greater harm 
because they bring together the individual contributions of members such that the sum 
is greater than the parts. Moreover, I do believe that there is a role for organizational 
criminal law at the international level, but not necessarily a lot of consensus on what this 
would look like, nor on what the overarching objectives would be.
At least some of the impetus for the interest in integrating an organizational basis of 
liability into international criminal law is being able to hold economic power to account. 
There is no question that there is a group of very large multinational players who wield 
sufficient economic power and influence to be, at least to some extent, beyond the reach 
of most individual states (with the exception of some OECD countries, in some specific 
areas). This comes as no surprise when one considers that there is a global competition 
for capital and resources which encourages states to offer legislation and regulation 
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weighted to favor organizational interests in the hopes of securing the economic benefits 
that organizations are believed to bring. The ability of multinational organizations to 
exploit jurisdictional differences with regard to the extent of organizational liability has 
tended to undermine efforts by individual states seeking to impose criminal liability on 
organizations. 
I believe that the chorus calling for some form of accountability at the international 
level as a means of overcoming the limits of national enforcement is growing bigger 
and stronger and that perhaps we are finally at a point where the idea of some kind 
of liability for organizations might get off the ground. Beyond the question of finding a 
way to make multinationals accountable, there is also some recognition that for certain 
kinds of wrongful conduct that are truly organizational in nature (large-scale environ-
ment degradation, systemic problems of corruption/subverting of state regulatory con-
trols over industrial/commercial activity, use of organized, coordinated campaigns of 
violence/intimidation to advance/protect commercial interests), the international arena 
may be the best place to situate accountability. Moreover, this accountability must go 
beyond holding natural persons to account for their personal actions as this is likely to 
underrepresent or misrepresent the nature and extent of the essentially collective or 
systemic character of the source of the wrongful conduct. 
In thinking about the drivers behind the push for extending international criminal law li-
ability to organizations, an obvious one is closing the so-called accountability gap. One 
can think about the accountability gap both in terms of who can be called to answer for 
crimes and what kinds of things are considered crimes. In organizational liability at the 
domestic level, both of these gaps exist to varying degrees. In the international arena, 
as there is no accountability at all for organizations, there is obviously an accountability 
gap because only individuals can be called to answer and only for their personal conduct. 
The more important part of the accountability gap is the sense that some kinds of 
wrongful behavior slip between the cracks of the current individually focused offence 
definitions. If, however, we think about the accountability gap in terms of the kinds of 
things for which we might call organizations to account, then I think there is the potential 
to do much more than simply say organizations are subject to criminal law. As my Venn 
diagram slide on corporate mens rea crimes shows, crimes are seen as corporate for 
different reasons. Some fit within the confines of traditional criminal law better than 
others, but all present challenges to the conventional individual liability model. First, 
traditional crimes can be committed by individuals but for corporate reasons (e.g., mur-
der, intimidation, assault). Although the corporate reason is not necessary to prove the 
offence against an individual, awareness of the corporate motive typically changes how 
we perceive the behavior – its gravity, in particular. What might under an individual 
model be seen as a discrete instance of wrongful behavior takes on a different hue 
when understood as one of a pattern of instances unified by a collective “corporate” 
I n t e r n a t I o n a l  c r I m I n a l  J u s t I c e72
p a n e l  v
goal the benefit of which accrues principally to the organization not to the individual 
who engages in the physical conduct that constitutes the crime (e.g., threats and violence 
to intimidate local people to cease lawful opposition to commercial development).
The second category of crimes is related to the first. These are crimes that cannot easily be 
separated from the business context in which they arise. The actual conduct is not illegal 
per se. What makes it criminal is either the circumstances in which the conduct occurs (or 
wrongful ends being pursued under the guise of what would otherwise be legal conduct) 
or the prohibited consequences that ensue. These crimes are often economic in nature – 
bid-rigging, price-fixing, accounting misrepresentations – although they may also arise 
where there has been gross negligence or recklessness in managing the foreseeable 
risks associated with running the business (an oil spill from a pipeline that is poorly 
maintained, a derailment of a runaway tanker train that is was improperly secured ; an 
explosion at a mine where safety protocols were not followed or there is lax oversight 
of compliance, etc.).
The final category overlaps with the second, particularly with regard to negligent or 
reckless risk management, but is more specifically focused on those situations that are 
the result of the cumulative effect of the conduct of more than one person (who may 
not, on their own, be sufficiently blameworthy to merit criminal accountability. These are 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
Conventional crime
committed for corporate
reasons, e.g. murder or
intimidation
Uniquely corporate
crimes, which require
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or involve system failures
Crime arises in connection
with pursuit of primary
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prohibited consequences
arising from prima facie
legal activities negligently
or recklessly undertaken
Figure 2. Corporate mens rea crimes.
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crimes caused by systemic failures that typically have at their source a policy or culture 
premised on an unacceptable tradeoff between private profit and other important 
values (whose benefits cannot as easily be reaped solely by the business, such as envi-
ronmental protection and safety) In domestic criminal law, accountability for such crimes 
is in its infancy because they require a locus of analysis that is different from the natural 
person. A handful of jurisdictions have tried to incorporate crimes that can be based on 
an enabling corporate culture. It is still too early to pass judgment on these experiments, 
although a significant challenge to date has been convincing prosecutors to bring cases.
It goes without saying that broadening our notion of crime beyond the limits of what is 
recognized for individuals presupposes that we are upholding important values. I am 
aware that human rights protection is the dominant value in individual international 
criminal law, but in the context of organizations, I think it may be helpful to consider the 
advancement and protection of other values as well, such as honesty and integrity in 
the provision of government services, environmental stewardship and establishing the 
outer limits of commercial freedom (legitimate commerce). And while it is not explicitly 
stated in the document, many of the new crimes that are included in the African Protocol 
reinforce the protection of human rights while also upholding values like the ones I have 
mentioned. 
There is a further – interstitial, if I may use that word – enforcement gap that could be 
remedied by international criminal law. This is the gap that emerges from either an un-
willingness or an inability of an individual state to enforce existing criminal law against 
organizations, regardless of whether they are multinational or not. In my view this is 
certainly one of the objectives of the African Protocol, where a multinational instrument 
would available to provide enforcement where the national state is unable to do so. 
From my work in this area I believe the strongest case for treating organizations as 
responsible actors in their own right has to be tied to the essence of the organization : 
that they are social structures (i.e., collectivities of people, not things) that are oriented 
around the pursuit of internal or external objectives. They exist separately from their 
individual members, but they remain entities created by and for the benefit of human 
beings (again, they are not things). Finally, organizations are created because they 
offer an advantage over individual pursuit of goals. This collective power creates the 
potential for greater good and greater harm than individual actions.
[After considering some of the challenges to organizational liability and offering some 
suggestions for the means of resolving these challenges, Ms. Quaid concluded as follows.]
There will be real resistance to corporate liability. If I have seemed very insistent on 
linking a corporate or organizational basis of liability to the collective nature and then 
tying it to the basic justifications of the criminal law, it is because I know the dangers of 
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being sloppy. In domestic law, corporate criminal liability, as a basic idea, continues to 
be challenged. Some continue to be believe that corporate criminal liability makes no 
sense and has no place in the criminal law. We can expect at least as much skepticism 
and resistance if corporate criminal liability is added to international criminal law. As a 
consequence, we need to be very clear about why it is necessary and justified so we can 
be prepared to respond to the furious opposition that will be raised.
The good news is I think that both from a theoretical and practical point of view, we can 
get the big issues right, and ensure legitimacy of the enterprise. Lots of great work is 
being done in this area by scholars and domestic law enforcement and this will provide 
ideas and support when we are ready to take the plunge. The African Protocol gives 
me hope that there is the will to do this, that it is important and that it will make a dif-
ference.
. . .
The second presentation on this panel, by James Stewart (UBC), offered some stark 
empirical evidence of the relevance of Jennifer Quaid’s interventions. Prof. Stewart 
explained that much of his work focuses on the relationship between commerce, atrocity 
and international criminal law. He looks at the responsibility of individuals who are in 
corporations (known as common in criminal liability), and of corporations committing 
crimes. Specifically, Stewart focuses on the extractive industry, the weapons industry 
and private militaries. One of his driving questions is : what does impunity look like in 
the weapons sector ? 
Since 1993, when investigations for weapons provision began, only one corporate in-
vestigation has taken place, and it resulted in an acquittal. This in spite of the fact that 
there have been 502 alleged allegations by panels of experts. In effect, people can 
supply weapons to whoever they like and not face any accountability, Prof. Stewart ex-
plained. “What’s the best way to get away with atrocity ? Incorporate. It’s even better 
than being the president of your country !”
The work, he said, is inherently controversial because weapon venders are often consid-
ered guilty because of their accomplices. Stewart argued that in egregious cases, there 
is a need to tweak the way enforcement is understood and law is practiced as it relates 
to organizations that sell weapons. We must understand that there is a range of crimes 
and a range of weapons, and that there are clear benefits to prosecuting in certain 
cases, while perhaps not in others.
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“What’s the best way to get away with atrocity ? Incorporate. It’s even 
better than being the president of  your country !” — James Stewart (UBC)
To offer an example, Stewart explained the legal reaction to the massacres that took 
place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) shortly after the Rwandan genocide, 
noting that they were mostly a continuation of that violence. Although Rwanda got the 
attention, the subsequent UN Panel of Experts on the DRC noted a “vicious triangle” in 
which the continuation of armed conflict with egregious violence was driven both by the 
purchase of weapons and resource extraction by foreign governments.
Prof. Stewart explained that cycles like these are self-supporting, and become “a win–
win incentive for all belligerents.” He argued that “we focus too much on the violence 
once the bloodletting had begun ; it is better to focus on the corporation that fuels it.” 
Stewart explained that there is precedence for this in Nuremburg with the Zyklon B case 
– people were held responsible for the use of their technology in Auschwitz. Also, in the 
1980s the Dutch prosecuted a national for selling chemicals to the Iraqi regime. 
Prof. Stewart then walked the participants through the various conditions that could 
prove most effective. Prosecutions could ideally be divided into three types, based on 
commerce (manufacturing, distribution and vending), weapon type (cluster ammunitions, 
nuclear weapons, etc.), and different international crimes (including, but not limited to 
homicides). These categories would allow more robust prosecutions for incidents like the 
Charles Taylor case (based on the widespread use of small arms in rape), for incidents 
that used cluster munitions and “indiscriminate attack”, and for the use of drones and 
the war crime of “terror” (e.g., the ICTY case that a sniper imposes “terror” on a civilian 
population because you can be shot at any time). He suggested that this might even 
apply to those who control or monitor the drones. Stewart further argued that crimes 
associated with nuclear weapons could include forced deportation, this because irradia-
tion of land will force populations to leave, and that prosecutions in this regard should 
be levelled not just at those who press the button, but those who manufacture, distribute 
and vend these weapons of mass destruction.
In Stewart’s view, these undertakings would create a shift in the use of criminal law to 
prosecute those engaged in indiscriminate attacks away from a very narrow definition 
of liability and toward an approach that broadened culpability to those who manufacture 
and distribute these weapons. He then outlined multiple benefits of this approach. 
On a practical level, this would offer new strategies for prosecutors to address the rape 
crisis in the DRC. If we focus on arms vendors then perhaps we can tie the military objec-
tives to compliance with international humanitarian law. “If your men continue to rape 
people, then it becomes harder to get arms,” and in this case there becomes a change 
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in the incentives for the militia, which might cause militias and formal military to police 
internally.
It would also spread responsibility in favorable ways. “There are a lot of human rights 
violations in Africa but we must question the assumption that only Africans bear respon-
sibility for atrocities in Africa. We must pay attention to foreign actors involved in the 
conflicts,” explained Stewart. This allows the Office of The Prosecutor to say : “when 
Western actors are implicated in these atrocities, we will hold them responsible or ensure 
their national jurisdictions do.”
Prof. Stewart noted that there is some evidence that corporations are more exposed, if 
not necessarily more deterrable, than individuals. For example, a Swiss company being 
tried for gold exploitation found that investigators could break down the doors of their 
office and take all the computers. This would have been harder to do if it had been an 
individual. That said, “it is also important to remember that there are often individuals 
behind groups.”
Stewart concluded by emphasizing the need for an interdisciplinary approach : “We 
need to bring together the media and those generating public opinion. We need forensic 
analysis at atrocity sites to piece together things : the doctors, ballistics and mapping. 
We need the criminal law and we need the legal theorists.”
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The discussion began with a question about how we use the term “organization” in this 
context : Are they non-state actors, or something else ? The panelists and participants 
remained divided on a precise definition, but in the case of these two presentations, it 
seemed useful to consider the term as referring to organizations very broadly, and not 
just social structures organized for profit motives (even if that may be where the greatest 
interest is). The definition could thus include churches and other non-state actors. 
Participants also expressed concern about how we might get around the attachment to 
the individual in criminal law, which seems to vex efforts to hold organizations account-
able. One speaker responded to this concern by insisting that while organizations are 
social structures, they are not people in a material sense ; that we need to be careful to 
avoid anthropomorphizing organizations. In order to do this we must create boundaries 
in the law that define the organization, but we also need to recognize that our fear of 
overreaching in Western law sometimes leaves us stuck. Indeed, it was only because of 
a push from the Global South that the UN Human Rights Commission began drafting a 
treaty on human rights and business.
As for the value of punishing an organization, one speaker made the case that the lack 
of accountability is based more on a lack of political and legal will than on a lack of 
evidence. Noting that there is rarely a lack of evidence of organizational wrongdoing, 
this speaker argued that what we need to do is build a more dynamic view of the nature 
of organizations within domestic law.
The group then turned to the issue of arms and sexual assault, as referred to in Prof. 
Stewart’s presentation. One participant said that weapons are exceeding easy to pur-
chase in the DRC – except in the case of women, who have no access to arms. This indi-
vidual wondered why we discuss arming rebels while no one talks about arming women 
in the DRC to defend themselves from rape. We talk about arming rebels in Syria and 
other vulnerable groups and yet we only conduct ex post facto investigations when it 
comes to rape. Why do we think that adding weapons to a conflict is a bad idea in the 
case of women, but it makes sense in the case of rebels in Syria ? [Editor’s note : This 
comment was made before the evidence of widespread female slavery and sexual 
abuse among ISIS groups was broadly available.] This is counterintuitive to the idea of 
disarming rapists, and certainly not a preventative response.
Complicating the issues of arms, one participant added that self-defense is important. 
It is a legitimate justification, but exceptions where self-defense can be demonstrated 
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cannot be made to obscure the widespread use of weapons for other reasons. For in-
stance, with chemical weapons a direct link to self-defense is extraordinarily difficult to 
establish. What we can often show is a direct intent : these chemicals in this amount must 
be used for these activities, and those activities are criminal.
The conversation then turned to the challenges that efforts around corporate criminal 
responsibility would face among the business sector and political elites in the Global 
North. Some speakers reminded the group that it was in fact pressure from poorer na-
tions that had produced any movement forward we have seen on these issues. One in 
particular raised the core issue of, what, in fact, is acceptable business practice, insisting 
that we should at least codify the relationship between business and human rights in 
international criminal law. The same speaker noted that the real question may be : do 
we need to codify or do we need to enforce ?
One final speaker noted that political stability was an essential precondition for these 
efforts at establishing accountability, and a key reason behind the advent of the concept 
of the Responsibility to Protect. The same speaker indicated that R2P is thus a critical 
and greatly underexplored part of any efforts to prevent atrocities.
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Rachel A. Cichowski, “Interest and Advocacy Group Use of the European 
Court of Human Rights” 
Georgette Gagnon, “Using International Justice in the Field : the Case of  
Afghanistan” 
Ruben Reike, “The Responsibility to Protect : Impetus or Obstacle for Enforcing 
International Criminal Justice ?” 
Nicole Barrett, “International Accountability in African Courts” 
Overview : This panel offered four opportunities for conference participants to consider the 
often unforeseen impacts of international criminal justice in practice. Prof. Cichowski’s and 
Ms. Gagnon’s presentations demonstrated the ways in which two distinct initiatives with no 
formal prosecutorial standing (the amicus brief in the European Court of Human Rights and 
the UN Human Rights Mission to Afghanistan) had a positive effect on the practice of hu-
man rights in two very different settings. Prof. Barrett offered the curious case of the trials 
of Habré and his henchmen, suggesting that, although these processes have proceeded in 
circuitous ways, the trials in Chad and Senegal represent significant achievements in terms 
of accountability, and perhaps even the prevention of future atrocities. Finally, Dr. Reike 
reminded  participants  that  the  ICC  faces  significant  risks  when  it  expands  its mandate 
beyond  the more narrow  legal processes  that adjudicate crimes after  the  fact. R2P has 
informed ICC investigations in both Libya and Syria, and in both instances these referrals 
have forced the Court  into a highly charged political debate  in ways that weakened its 
support among critical constituencies.
The first presentation on this panel, by Rachel Cichowski, broadened the scope of our 
discussions by introducing the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as an agent of 
international criminal justice. Prof. Cichowski examined how international courts transform 
domestic law and have both empowered and constrained nation states. Her questions 
focused on the role of both individuals and civil society in generating democratic critique. 
In other words, can courts provide a means of enhancing rather than prohibiting and 
constraining human rights ? 
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Her goal was to move beyond state-dominated approaches to international law and 
international organizations, and to theorize what this can mean for the legal process, 
with a special emphasis on understanding who is using this avenue of participation and 
how they are using it. Prof. Cichowski’s current project looks at the Court’s decisions in 
1960–2011, paying particular attention to those with Third Party Interventions (amicus), 
and combines these with national implementation measures (or actions taken by the 
states in response to the ECHR decisions).
“The goal is to move beyond state-dominated approaches to international 
law and international organizations, and to theorize what this can mean 
for the legal process.” — Rachel A. Cichowski
In this research she has found that original treaties tended to constrain individual and 
group access to redress, but that changes in access evolved through the case law. These 
were ultimately codified in 1998, so that today, individual and group access is codified 
in the Convention.
Figure 3. ECHR Amicus Participation by Organization  
and Advocacy Type, 1984–2011.
Source: Data compiled by the author from HUDOC, the database of case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/).
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Amicus briefs played a critical role in this process dating to 1978, when in Tyrer vs. UK the 
National Council of Civil Liberties tried to bring a brief and was denied. In the following 
year, in Winererp vs. Netherlands, the UK Government asked a third party to accept 
briefs. Two years later (in 1981) in the case Young, James and Webster vs. UK, the court 
ruled that a trade union could be third party. From then on these practices became a 
part of case law. They were codified in the 1998 reforms of the Court.
In evaluating the cases from 1984 to 2011, Cichowski was able to examine a broad 
array of active interventions before the court, and concluded that “it is not just rights 
groups. There is an increased amount and diversity of voices having access to the Court 
and seeing it as a viable forum and use of legal advocacy. It is a dialogical relationship.” 
Still her evidence showed both that the potential impact of the Court was undermined 
by significant backlogs and that powerful states (notably Russia) are playing a potential 
role in sabotaging the Court’s work by refusing to address these delays. Prof. Cichowski 
concluded her presentation by noting that “the states’ commitment to the role of law 
Figure 4. Total Number of Organization  
and Advocacy Types Submitting Amicus, 1984–2011.
Source: Data compiled by the author from HUDOC, the database of case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/).
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must be seen at the domestic and international level,” but that organizations and third 
parties are clearly having an impact in the way human rights are being adjudicated by 
the Court.
. . .
The second presentation on this panel was delivered by Georgette Gagnon, who from 
2010 to June 2015 led the human rights unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) and represented the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights in the country. Her presentation focused on how the UNAMA’s Human Rights 
Unit uses international criminal justice and how they leveraged their human rights work 
on the ground in pursuit of international criminal justice and accountability for serious 
human rights violations and international crimes.
Ms. Gagnon began by stating that after 30 years of war, Afghanistan is a country 
characterized by neither stability nor justice. “There are very few domestic prosecutions, 
no truth commissions, no sustained national or international calls for justice and account-
ability… but it’s not a total black hole on international criminal justice,” she emphasized.
She suggested that UNAMA Human Rights has chipped away at the entrenched impunity 
for international crimes in Afghanistan by operationally linking the Mission’s work to 
protect civilians in the armed conflict and with torture of conflict-related detainees, and 
international criminal justice. Under UN Security Council Resolution 2210 (March 16, 
2015), human rights is a key priority in the Mission’s mandate, with many references to 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The Human Rights Unit 
has a specific mandate to monitor the situation of civilians, coordinate efforts to ensure 
their protection, promote accountability and assist in implementing the human rights 
provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties ratified by Afghanistan.
The human rights team (91 officers, mainly Afghan colleagues, 70 percent of whom 
work in UNAMA’s 13 field offices) operationalizes this mandate through targeted fact-
finding, public reporting, and strategic public and private advocacy with government 
actors, armed opposition groups, international military forces, civil society, different 
communities across Afghanistan and donors. From among five priority areas Ms. Gagnon 
highlighted two : protection of civilians in the armed conflict, and ending/preventing 
torture and ill treatment of conflict-related detainees by Afghan security, police and 
military forces.
Through its mandate on protection of civilians, UNAMA has worked to address the short-
term imperative of reduction/prevention of civilian casualties and improved compliance 
with international humanitarian law and the longer-term need to lay the groundwork 
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for future efforts at accountability through building a record and detailed evidentiary 
base on the impact of the war on civilians. They have done this through “sustained sys-
tematic documentation” and the use of rigorous methodologies to document war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. They found that approximately 47,000 civilians have been 
killed and injured in the conflict since 2009. 
Through these efforts, UNAMA Human Rights developed and implemented best prac-
tices on civilian casualty recording within the UN system and externally. According to 
Gagnon, they documented the conduct of all parties to determine whether they were 
complying with Common Article 3 and relevant sections of the Rome Statute and found 
that deliberate attacks against civilians, targeted killings, indiscriminate attacks and 
gender-based violence were occurring. They used these data and analysis to create 
public reports, and to make detailed policy recommendations and carry out advocacy 
with all parties to the conflict. Published every six months, their reports on protection of 
civilians discuss tactics, protection trends, specific cases, emerging areas of harm/early 
warning and prevention. In 2014, UNAMA verified 4,247 incidents of conflict-related 
violence impacting civilians throughout Afghanistan. These were recorded by perpetrator, 
tactic, target type, victim demographic attributes including gender and age, date and 
location, and certain incidents and actions that may amount to war crimes As such, the 
reports provide a critical public (historical) record, and enable certain forms of targeted 
advocacy with all parties.
According to Ms. Gagnon, this documentation and advocacy has yielded changes in 
both policy and practice, including changes in the conduct of hostilities, reduced civilian 
casualties and enhanced compliance with international humanitarian law. She specifically 
pointed to changes in tactics and procedures by international and Afghan forces on air 
strikes, night raids and explosive remnants of war. She also noted changes in messaging 
by the Taliban, which has increasingly stressed protection of civilians with some changes 
observed in their targeting with more attacks directed at Afghan forces, more warnings 
to communities about the location of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but with much 
more needed to reduce civilian casualties by the Taliban. Still, 75 percent of all civilian 
casualties attributed to Anti-Government Elements. 
Efforts at documentation also have an impact on the level and forms torture committed by 
Afghan security forces. Ms. Gagnon’s office began systematic documentation of torture 
of conflict-related detainees several years ago, and published three reports (including 
one released in February 2015). They interviewed 1,500 detainees, Afghan officials 
and others and found that almost half of detainees interviewed had been tortured or 
ill-treated. “There is strong evidence that the Afghan Government is committing the war 
crime of torture as defined under Rome Statute,” said Gagnon.
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Still, based on the reports, recommendations and follow up actions taken, the situation 
is changing. After UNAMA’s first report on torture, international forces which had been 
transferring their detainees to Afghan custody stopped transfers and brought in a pro-
gram of detention monitoring, inspection and remedial measures. After the second report, 
international forces revised their program to make it more robust and Afghan President 
Karzai appointed a fact-finding commission that confirmed UNAMA’s findings. The Afghan 
President also issued a decree aimed at curtailing torture and ill treatment by Afghan 
forces.
UNAMA’s recent report documents a 14 percent reduction in the incidence of torture 
among detainees interviewed, compared to UNAMA’s previous reporting period. The 
Afghan government also introduced a national plan on the elimination of torture. That 
said, the Afghan government has not pursued any efforts at accountability and no Afghan 
officials have been prosecuted for torture.
Ms. Gagnon turned to the work of the ICC preliminary examination in Afghanistan in 
her concluding remarks. The evidence gathered by the UN Mission has been essential 
to the work of the ICC in Afghanistan – and particularly its finding (outlined in the ICC’s 
December 2014 public report) that war crimes and crimes against humanity were and 
continue to be committed under articles 7 and 8 of the ICC Statute, indicating a reason-
able basis to conclude that crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed. 
“We believe that the work UNAMA Human Rights has done in the field in Afghanistan 
has provided a basis and significantly contributed to the ICC’s preliminary examination. 
References to UNAMA can be found in the preliminary examination materials and the 
ICC’s 2014 public report. UNAMA’s work has led to some positive changes on the 
ground now and will perhaps provide information on which to build a foundation for 
future accountability.” As there is “no national effort,” there appears to be no conflict of 
complementarity. The decision about how to proceed is now in the Office of the Prosecutor, 
but Ms. Gagnon expressed the view that the evidence is quite clear on which the ICC 
can draw conclusions whether to open an investigation. 
. . .
Our third presentation on this panel, by Nicole Barrett, drew from her work on the Hissène 
Habré case in Chad to describe the ways in which the African Union has approached 
legal accountability for atrocities. In a case that Desmond Tutu calls “an interminable 
legal soap opera,” it has taken 25 years for Habré to be brought to justice, 15 of which 
involved active attempts to prosecute Habré in the courts of several countries.
According to Prof. Barrett, the trial is an important example from which we might 
gain insights into the problems surrounding complementarity, preference for domestic 
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accountability, and the importance of understanding the specific context in which these 
trials take place (in this case the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of 
Senegal, which can consider the international crimes committed by Habré and his top 
associates).
The contours of the case have been extraordinarily complex. In 2000 victims’ group 
brought cases against Habré in Chad and Belgium. After a four-year investigation, the 
Belgian courts indicted Habré on charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
torture. When the Belgians sought Habré’s extradition in 2005, however, the Senegalese 
courts decided they lacked jurisdiction to decide on the extradition request. 
In 2006, the African Union asked Senegal to prosecute Habré “on behalf of Africa.” 
It proved excessively costly to mount this trial, however, and given the meagre judicial 
budgets of most members of the African Union, it took more than four years to agree to 
the 8.6 million euro budget for the trial. In the interim, the possibility of trial was thrown 
into doubt when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) found that 
the proposed retroactive application of criminal law, which was not permitted under 
Senegal’s constitution, would violate Habré’s human rights. The African Union responded 
to ECOWAS ruling by proposing a plan in 2011 for special Chambers within the Sen-
egalese justice system to hear the case. After the election in Senegal in 2012 of a new 
president who was a strong supporter of international criminal justice, the process to 
prosecute Habré in Senegal began moving forward. Senegal amended its constitution to 
allow for the prosecution of international crimes via the theory of universal jurisdiction in 
order to give the Senegalese courts jurisdiction over the case. Finally, Senegal created 
a special chambers in their appeals court, called the Extraordinary African Chambers, 
to hear the Habré case, which included judges from both Senegal and the African Union.
The following year, the government of Chad decided to prosecute many of Habré’s 
henchman and refused to send five of them to Senegal to be tried alongside Habré, 
despite the request from the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal to extradite 
them. It was unclear why the government of Chad decided to undertake these trials 
after 13 years of inactivity, but Prof. Barrett argued that this represented a significant 
political shift and opportunity for prosecution.
In explaining the benefits of the Extraordinary African Chambers being located within the 
Courts of Senegal, Barrett indicated that Habré would not enjoy immunity as the head of 
state, that amnesty was irrelevant, and that the court had jurisdiction over international 
crimes – crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and torture. In short, the Ex-
traordinary African Chambers has jurisdiction to prosecute “the person or persons most 
responsible” for international crimes committed in Chad during Habré’s rule [editor’s 
note : the Habré trial began in July 2015]. She found it good that the trial would be held 
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in Africa with African judges, as this would allow it to avoid the charges of neocolonialism 
frequently lodged by African leaders against the International Criminal Court.
Prof. Barrett speculated that this trial would represent something quite distinct from the 
trial of the 21 henchmen in Chad, which she had observed in person in early 2015. 
“There were lots of victims in attendance at the trial. They really felt satisfied by the 
fact the trial was going on. They had waited 24 years. This [trial] was an acknowledge-
ment that terrible things had occurred and these wrongs were finally being addressed.” 
As much a truth commission as a criminal trial, it was not uncommon to have witnesses 
reflect at length on past events. According to Barrett, there was “a lot of reflection and 
memorialization.” She recounted a specific example of the head of the national truth 
commission screening a film that showcased the places and implements of torture. When 
he did so, many in the public audience wept. Such extensive victim participation will 
likely be missing in the Extraordinary African Chambers. Barrett reflected : “Here I am 
writing down procedural irregularities, but for victims the trial was incredibly significant. 
Must Chad’s criminal trials meet international standards for justice to be done ?” She 
also noted that the whole process was being televised.
Given that one of the purposes of international criminal justice is to act as a deterrent 
and prevent future crimes, Prof. Barrett was curious as to whether the trial would have a 
deterrent effect. She explained that there were 40 armed guards from various branches 
of the military and police in the courtroom, watching their former leaders be tried for 
Figure 5. Photo from the Criminal Trial of the 21 Habré Henchmen  
(N’Djamena, Chad), with Nicole Barrett in attendance, January 13, 2015. 
Source: UBC (http://news.ubc.ca/2015/01/14/dictators-henchmen-on-trial-ubc-expert-at-historic-
torture-trial-in-chad/).
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crimes, which she found to be significant. Although the domestic trial was less rigorous 
than an international trial would have been, “it felt like you were watching the building 
of domestic capacity.
“Here I am writing down procedural irregularities, but for victims the trial 
was incredibly significant. Must Chad’s criminal trials meet international 
standards for justice to be done ?” — Nicole Barrett
That said, Barrett noted several problems with the trial. The lawyers were given two 
weeks to prepare for trial, leaving little time to prepare a defense. The investigation 
was rushed and, as a result, the charge sheets were collective, and it was not always 
clear which charges applied to the individual defendants. Adding to the confusion was 
the fact that only one month was allocated for the trial of 21 people. Money was very 
tight in this trial, and became even more of a problem when news of potential repara-
tions suddenly increased the number of victims coming forward. Last, there were security 
concerns, underscored by the fact that the lead victims’ counsel was the victim of an as-
sassination attempt.
Prof. Barrett also noted that there was little international attention paid to this case, and 
thought that this may have had some impact on the process. Observers included only 
one Human Rights Watch observer and one BBC Afrique stringer, which resulted in only 
a few minor news articles. By contrast, the Habré trial has a $1.3 million outreach bud-
get, largely due to the fact that the Extraordinary African Chambers has a trust fund 
supported by member states.
Barrett concluded by reminding participants that it is essential to examine closely the 
context in which these trials take place. For example, during the trial in Chad, the bar 
association went on strike twice for back pay, security was a real concern, and “it felt 
like no one in the world was watching. There was very little dissemination about what 
was going on outside of Chad.” She also pointed out is critically important that we not 
simply measure these trials against some sort of imagined international standard, but 
that we ask ourselves who benefits from such a standard, and what sorts of justice are 
ultimately needed in these specific contexts.
. . .
Ruben Reike closed the panel with an analysis of the relationship between R2P and 
international criminal justice. He began by explaining that Chief Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda has gone on record saying that the ICC could be seen as the legal arm of R2P, 
and that the two can mutually reinforce each other. Such sentiments position the ICC is an 
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additional instrument to deter crimes and to enforce international criminal law. However, 
Dr. Reike suspects the responsibilities of the ICC do not align neatly with the goals of 
R2P, which was intended as a political and diplomatic framework. Specifically, political 
mediation can become more difficult when one adds judicialization. So, for Reike, the 
question is : once the ICC is activated do you lose political opportunities ?
R2P is ordinarily recognized as a political commitment in response to genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Since 2005 prevention has 
emerged as the primary function of R2P, and many have argued that R2P ought to be 
a useful tool for the ICC, but when one examines the Libyan and Syrian cases, it is not 
clear that the R2P and the ICC work in a complementary fashion.
Beginning with the Libyan case, Reike noted that the referral to the ICC was supposedly 
to be “part of the package of deterrence and encouraging defections.” It was assumed 
there would be fewer large-scale atrocities after the referral. The ICC was put in a dif-
ficult situation here, working mainly with anecdotal evidence and in a context where the 
speed with which events unfolded made mediation impossible. He noted however, that 
several observers belied that the ICC’s presence only complicated the mediation efforts 
that were undertaken. Negotiators tried to avoid mentioning the ICC when talking to 
interlocutors, although they admitted it was the bombing by NATO and not the ICC that 
ended mediation efforts. The African Union similarly argued that the ICC hampered 
mediation in this case. 
This was in part because, contrary to Security Council’s expectations, the ICC moved for-
ward very quickly on the situation. According to Dr. Reike this gave many of the actors 
in the conflict the impression that when acting on the principles of R2P, the ICC investiga-
tion represented the first step toward military intervention. The ICC was also hampered 
by the fact that in order to win the cooperation of the US it had to give the Americans 
immunity from prosecution, a widely known fact that engendered little cooperation on 
the ground, and only further strengthened arguments that an ICC investigation was the 
first step toward military intervention. This argument has been used actively by Russia to 
undermine subsequent ICC referrals. 
The Syrian case, argued Reike, was much more complicated. The reasons of the referral 
were myriad, including moral outrage, a desire to prevent further atrocities, and per-
haps other geo-political imperatives. Those supporting the ICC resolution also wanted 
to expose and isolate Russia and China in order to leverage a stronger resolution on 
cross-border humanitarian access (this was granted a few weeks after the referral).
In this case then, the ICC was used as a bargaining chip, and yet after the initial conces-
sions by the major actors there was very little follow up in initiating the cases, a failure 
that many assumed to be the result of a series of political compromises by the Court. Dr. 
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Reike concluded that this was a pretty clear case in which we must recognize that the 
Security Council has often used the referral to the ICC as a strategic tool, with ‘justice” as 
a secondary concern. In addition, “there has been a mixed record of success when one 
compares ICC intervention and the lack thereof, such as in Libya and Iraq, respectively.” 
Dr. Reike closed with some thoughts on the implications of these experiences for R2P 
and the ICC. As for R2P, referrals sent the message that accountability was possible. 
They also paved the way for cross-border humanitarian access, which did in fact help to 
protect some individuals. As for the ICC, these experiences exposed the court to some 
reputational damage. Even though it was broadly believed that the referral would be 
vetoed, it was passed, but with some very controversial clauses (on US immunity and the 
issue of the Golan Heights). The debate also pushed China more into a camp that opposes 
the ICC, creating significant long-term political challenges for the Court.
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The discussion began exactly where Dr. Reike ended, with a series of concerns about 
the implication that ICC and R2P should be delinked. Reike provided clarification of 
his remark : if R2P is discredited then so is everything else, including the ICC. He sug-
gested that narrowing down what constitutes military intervention invariably produces 
unintended consequences, and that it remained critical that the ICC maintain its power 
of leverage.
The discussion then turned to issues related to impunity and compensation in a variety 
of settings. One speaker noted that even between the Habré trial and trials in Chad, 
the different funding contexts of the courts meant that reparations could vary widely. 
Another noted that humanitarian efforts in other countries also often entail compensation 
to civilians. The US government has been paying civilians compensation, and so has the 
Afghan government, but mostly on an ad hoc basis. The Afghan constitution also has a 
provision for seeking compensation for violations by government for torture, but it is not 
consistently enforced.
On the issue of impunity, some speakers wondered whether or not victims’ groups believed 
these procedures would result in any sort of accountability. Another replied that even 
without formal forms of accountability, these processes were often very important for 
victims. This same speaker noted that one of the issues here are tensions between common 
law approaches to criminal justice and procedures that emphasize the voices or interests 
of victims. 
The discussion then turned to the Darfur referral. One speaker said he had originally 
been a strong supporter of this referral but came to regret that decision, and argued 
that referrals like these risk undermining international rule of law and had become 
an enormous liability for the court. In addition to this principled objection, the speaker 
argued that the way it is done is problematic. “There is a doctrinal flaw in the concept of 
referrals”, which is in conflict with the fundamental principle of equality before the rule 
of law. The same speaker argued that we should look at R2P’s sequence of prevention, 
reaction, repair, punishment as a linear function, rather than “collapsing” prevention and 
punishment in a confusing and unproven way.
Several others concurred with this view. One suggested that the Office of the Prosecutor 
could have argued that Security Council should give “proper” referrals, without the 
problematic additions to them. Another asked, “Could a rule be created that the ICC 
cannot operate during active military operations ?” “What about drones in Afghanistan ? 
It’s not just casualties but rather it is terror. How is that measured ?”
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Fannie Lafontaine, “To Prosecute or What ? National Jurisdictions and the 
Gaps in Closing the Impunity Gap” 
David Petrasek, “The ICC and peace Processes : Is a Balance Possible ?” 
Onur Bakiner, “Cycles of Universal Jurisdiction : Ideas and Legal Mobilization” 
Overview : This panel offered three distinct views on the contemporary challenges of imple-
mentation of universal jurisdiction. Fannie Lafontaine’s close examination of the incoher-
ence between states’  internal  laws and  international  treaties, particularly with regard to 
establishing  jurisdiction, what  is criminalized and the obligation  to “prosecute or extra-
dite”, highlighted the issues international criminal law must address if it is to become more 
effective. David Petrasek  reminded participants  of  the difficult  challenges  that  the  ICC 
faces in contexts where the imperatives of justice seem to conflict with the need for peace or 
security, and argued for the use of complementary bodies (advisory groups) and processes 
with local legitimacy to shield the Prosecutor’s Office from politicization. Onur Bakiner’s 
analysis of  the political fallout from universal  jurisdiction  laws among European nations 
adds another dimension to this story, reminding participants that it is not only a question 
of whether innovations in universal jurisdiction fill the gaps or are conducive to peace in 
societies riven by conflict. They must also take into consideration the political backlash in 
nations outside of conflict zones, where a variety of interested parties see their economic 
and political fortunes placed at risk by these novel forms of justice.
Fannie Lafontaine began this panel by revisiting the problem of immunity through a 
consideration of the uneven ways that national jurisdictions align with international 
obligations. Prof. Lafontaine’s presentation is excerpted below.
The general purpose of the paper is thus to highlight gaps in the existing framework and 
system of accountability for international crimes where national courts are concerned. 
I will discuss gaps related to two distinct but closely related issues, namely 1) the gap 
in existing legal obligations imposed on states as regards core crimes and 2) the gaps 
in interstate cooperation in the enforcement of international criminal law. As the title 
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hints, one issue I will focus on is the “what”, the silent alternative to prosecution – that is, 
the much talked-about but seldom used “extradition”, the effective missing limb of the 
obligation “to prosecute or extradite”. Canada will often be used as an example – not 
so much as an example to follow – but as an illustration of how the gaps in the current 
system prevent states to contribute to close the impunity gap as they should, or as they 
must.
The first critical gap is the discrepancy of legal obligations imposed upon states in inter-
national law as regards the core crimes. Legal obligations can relate to three distinct but 
closely related concepts : 1) the obligation to criminalize the offence in domestic law ; 2) 
the obligation to give national courts jurisdiction over the core crimes (prescriptive juris-
diction, which can be territorial or extraterritorial, including on the basis of universality) ; 
and 3) the obligation to exercise jurisdiction, most often where a suspect is found on a 
state’s territory and embodied in the obligation aut dedere aut judicare, or the obligation 
to prosecute or extradite.
International treaty law is very uneven in its prescriptions regarding the three obliga-
tions mentioned above. As is well known, while the Rome Statute, in its preamble and 
by implication of the complementarity principle, provides for States Parties’ duty to 
prosecute the international crimes contemplated in the Statute, it is generally accepted 
that it does not create an treaty obligation on the part of states to criminalise the core 
crimes in their legislation, nor obliges them to establish jurisdiction, be it territorial or 
extraterritorial and less so to exercise jurisdiction.
The Genocide Convention provides an obligation to criminalise, to establish and exercise 
territorial jurisdiction and to facilitate extradition to the territorial state. For crimes 
against humanity, there are obviously no treaty obligations as there are no treaties 
(yet), but the Convention against Torture (CAT) and the Convention against Enforced Dis-
appearance, which target discrete crimes which can constitute crimes against humanity, 
provide the most recent and state-of-the art provisions for all three obligations. Finally, 
the Geneva Conventions also provide for all three obligations for war crimes committed in 
an international armed conflict. For war crimes committed in “Non-International Armed 
Conflict” (NIAC), there are no such obligations.
It should also be noted that human rights treaties have been interpreted as obliging 
states to investigate with a view of prosecution grave human rights violations in order 
to secure an effective remedy to victims. This has had a tremendous impact in certain 
regions, notably in Latin America, where states instituted proceedings and annulled am-
nesty laws following decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, this 
obligation is only imposed to territorial states and should remain parallel to obligations 
arising out of criminal law conventions, which have a different purpose.
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In summary, the Swiss cheese of international obligations has many holes, with the con-
sequence that for most core crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity as such and war 
crimes in NIAC), there are no obligations to prosecute or extradite. There may be a rule 
of customary law emerging obliging states to prosecute or extradite, but a safer view 
at the moment is that customary international law provides for a permissive rather than 
mandatory rule.
This piecemeal and incomplete approach to treaty-making for core crimes means that 
for crimes of similar gravity, there are unjustifiably unequal obligations for states. This 
incoherence manifests itself in the three types of obligations. The first concerns criminal-
ization.
The extent to which states have included the core crimes in their domestic criminal legis-
lation and the manner in which they do – it is quite chaotic. Some criminalize genocide 
but nothing else, some will adopt a definition for just one crime against humanity (for 
example, Apartheid), many will only criminalise war crimes committed in International 
Armed Conflict (IAC), etc. 
The non-existence of the core crimes in national legislation can have at least two impacts 
with regard to role that the state in question can play in the global endeavor to put an 
end to impunity. First and obviously, it means that its courts cannot prosecute the underly-
ing acts that are constitutive of an international crime as an international crime. Second, 
the absence of core crimes in domestic legislation can block extradition requests from 
other states where the applicable law provides for a strict rule of double criminality. 
For instance, if Canada requests extradition of a suspect of torture as a crime against 
humanity who resides in Mali, Mali law might require that the crime for which extradition 
is sought be also criminalized in Mali. If it is not, it prevents extradition.
The incoherence in the legal obligations also leads to chaos and uncertainty regarding 
prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e., which heads of extraterritorial jurisdiction states provide 
for in their internal laws. Despite lack of explicit obligation in the Rome Statute, many 
states have taken advantage of the need to adopt implementing legislation tor also 
provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction for the core crimes. 
So, states do provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction, but in an incoherent and unequal 
fashion as regards all core crimes. Of course, the lack of international obligations as 
regards prescriptive jurisdiction means that the web meant to close the impunity gap 
is filled with holes. A fugitive war criminal would be better off in Austria or Kenya, for 
instance, which only provide for limited universal jurisdiction for piracy and other crimes, 
but not all core crimes, than in Canada, which does. 
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This relates essentially to the obligation to prosecute or extradite which, let us recall, 
only exists explicitly in treaty law with respect to war crimes committed in IAC and tor-
ture and enforced disappearances as discrete crimes which can also constitute crimes 
against humanity. So, for ICC crimes, the crimes of gravest concern to the international 
community, there are, essentially, no obligations at international law. That is the greatest 
irony. 
If we were to adopt a formal obligation at international law, we could potentially see 
two major impacts. First, from a positive perspective, the existence of obligations can 
influence in a significant manner the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, by will or (ju-
dicial) force, actually leading to effective results. To begin with, one would think that an 
obligation at international law to investigate (and to submit the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution) would be taken into account by a state’s 
prosecution authorities in the exercise of their discretion to launch a criminal prosecution. 
In Canada, international obligations are allegedly taken into account in the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. Faced with a treaty obligation, it is presumed Canadian 
authorities will act with a view of not breaching the international obligation.
Also, as provided for in treaties that do provide for an obligation aut dedere aut judi-
care, like the CAT Art. 7(1) (2), on whether to prosecute, upon examination of informa-
tion available to it, “these authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as 
in the case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State”. 
This apparently innocuous prescription can actually carry great weight. In Canada, the 
decision to prosecute in general cases takes into account two criteria : the existence of 
a reasonable prospect of conviction and public interest. Generally, the graver the of-
fence, the more likely it is that a prosecution will take place. Provided there is sufficient 
evidence, it is certain, for instance, that a prosecutor will launch a prosecution for the 
crime of murder. Where international crimes are concerned, however, these criteria, 
formally applicable as per the information rendered available by the War Crimes 
program, become almost irrelevant. Suffice it to say that provided there is sufficient 
evidence to reach the level of a reasonable prospect of conviction – which obviously 
brings particular challenges in extraterritorial prosecutions – the main guiding principle 
is very different than for ordinary crimes, and not glamorous : it is money. 
The second tangible impact explicit obligations at international law to exercise jurisdic-
tion (aut dedere aut judicare) could have, this time seen from a negative perspective, is 
that, a contrario, the absence of clear obligations could then not be invoked as a justifi-
cation to not use the existing legislation to investigate or prosecute, where other motives 
may wrongly justify the refusal to do so…. The gaps in the existing system favor arbi-
trary distinctions not based on traditional factors related to whether to initiate criminal 
proceedings, i.e., reasonable prospect for conviction and public interest. It creates an 
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environment that is not conducive to a sense of ownership and responsibility by states in 
the fight against impunity.
The horizontal, or indirect, enforcement of international criminal law through state coop-
eration is weakly provided for in international multinational treaties. The Rome Statute 
provides for an extensive vertical cooperation regime that has its own challenges, but 
does not provide anything as regards horizontal cooperation to implement effectively 
the complementarity principle. 
Extradition suffers from the gaps in the multilateral treaties on international crimes 
mentioned above. The CAT and other more recent treaties, such as that on Enforced 
Disappearances, provide for a detailed regime regarding extradition and mutual legal 
assistance, but the applicable scope of these treaties is very limited. Interstate coopera-
tion for the core crimes relies thus almost exclusively on bilateral and regional treaties 
as well as domestic law. This aspect of the enforcement system of international criminal 
justice is under-developed and perhaps less sexy than other issues, but it is the future of 
international criminal justice.
New treaties, new obligations, will only partly close the impunity gap. Recourse to extra-
dition can still be limited by a number of factors. In order to even enter the possibility of 
extradition, there needs to be a request from the state wishing to prosecute the suspect. 
For that to happen, it is necessary that the state knows the whereabouts of the suspect 
or is informed by the state where said suspect ended up. Here, there is still a lot of work. 
There is a nice initiative by Interpol for fugitives but it is still quite limited (mainly to 
Rwanda). Usually, these suspects will be detected through the immigration system when 
they seek refugee status or some immigration status in a third state. They can then be 
identified on “reasonable grounds to believe” that they have committed an international 
crime, thereby leading to exclusion from refugee status, for instance. But this process is 
classically very secretive and confidential. Immigration officers do not necessarily share 
information with the Prosecutor or, even more complicated, with other states or local 
victims’ groups. There is little information sharing with the state where crimes may have 
been committed, so obviously no possible extradition request. 
The EU’s Genocide Network for cooperation amongst member states is promising and 
has already led to concrete results. But there is a lot of work that needs to be invested 
in the idea of information-sharing, including respect for the suspect’s human rights. There 
needs to be some thought given to a new perspective for the custodial state of being 
proactive in seeking extradition requests from territorial states where it has information 
that a suspect who entered its territory has been involved in war crimes. The current pas-
sive attitude leads to a state-centric “no safe haven” perspective that does not fully take 
into account the responsibility of each state in the fight against impunity.
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The perfect system would then heed on the ICJ’s decision in Habré, according to which 
“prosecution is an obligation, extradition an option”…
We’re not there yet, but this is where we need to go.
. . .
David Petrasek, a former activist with Amnesty International turned academic, focused 
his presentation on the role the ICC could play in peace processes. In his activist days 
he tended to take an uncompromising view on justice issues. “NGOs tend to have a very 
strong line, and I did as well, but when I began to do back channel mediation work I 
became less convinced of the firm line.” 
Petrasek’s core concern is the competing need to seek peace and the demands of justice 
in societies emerging from conflict. Examining the cases of Mali, Afghanistan, DRC, and 
Columbia, he concluded there was overwhelming evidence that the work of justice could 
not proceed without a careful balancing with the imperatives of peace negotiations, 
which sometimes hinge on a certain degree of immunity for combatants. 
He explained this need was written into the founding acts of the ICC. Article 53(1) and 
(2) of the Rome Statute allows the Prosecutor to halt a prosecution if it would be in inter-
ests of justice. According to Prof. Petrasek, there was an assumption that the “peace vs. 
justice debate” could be resolved within the Prosecutor’s office through Article 53 itself.
“[We should] widen ‘interests of  justice’ but shield the Office of  The Pros-
ecutor in different ways, perhaps through creating advisory bodies (for 
example expert panels) – to broaden the decision and protect the Office 
of  the Prosecutor from direct political influence which could undermine 
legitimacy.” — David Petrasek
In 2007 the Office of the Prosecutor issued a policy paper on Interests of Justice, which 
said three important things. First, “the interest of justice was interpreted to mean the 
interest of victims and by and large interests of victims was assumed to mean prosecu-
tion.” Second, alternate approaches are welcome and seen as complementary, but their 
existence will not be something taken into account under “interests of justice.” Third, the 
Security Council can defer a prosecution if there is need for a peace process.
Prof. Petrasek then turned to the “interesting relationship” between Article 53 and Article 
16-5c. If the purpose of the Court is to prosecute, and Article 16-5c can deter prosecution 
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if it is a threat to peace or security, he argued, then this is a political function. It seems 
that “the interest of justice is something more than the interest of victims.” 
In sum, Petrasek believes that the negative impacts of prosecution are overblown. Rather, 
the problem is appearing to defer to political calculation. This can have several conse-
quences. “If you are deferring prosecution are you handing power to rebel leaders ? 
Are victims only victims in the past, or also victims in the present and in the future ?”
All of this requires a broader approach to international criminal justice than is often the 
case. Justice is more than criminal prosecutions – it could include other transitional justice 
mechanisms. Indeed, if the primary goal is to end gross human rights abuse, the most 
important factor is to end conflict, and for this reason domestic prosecutors need the 
discretion to decline to press charges.
Still, a broader approach to justice is somewhat difficult put into practice. “Some argue 
that the way out is not to have a policy [but] to live with and embrace the vagueness,” 
but this is not something that Petrasek supports. Recognizing that the current policy is 
too open and is generating controversy, he argued that institutions like the ICC need to 
adopt a clear and defensible policy on when and where to initiate prosecutions in these 
contexts. Moreover, although Article 16 seems to apply an escape clause, it really is 
not, because Security Council’s threshold (threats to international peace and security) 
may be too high, the politics of Security Council too contentious, and there is a fear of 
setting precedence.
Prof. Petrasek did endorse a policy that began with a close reading of the facts on 
the ground, including risk assessment and the use of non-criminal domestic processes. 
He also noted that the Office of the Prosecutor appears to understand the importance 
of local context, in that they have dealt with the issue by moving slowly and carefully 
through the preliminary examination phase in their investigations. They have generally 
taken a wait-and-see approach to their work, waiting until late in the process to commit 
to formal investigation. While Petrasek is sympathetic to this, he warned, “inevitably you 
will run into problems and the process is not transparent… that is, the deference to local 
circumstances is being done in a non-transparent way.” 
He suggested that a better approach would entail widening “the interests of justice” 
while shielding the Office of the Prosecutor in different ways. One possible means would 
be to create advisory bodies (for example, expert panels) to broaden the decision-
making process and protect it from the types of direct political influence that could 
undermine legitimacy.
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These might be subtle practices, but inasmuch as they can produce forms of justice that 
balanced universal claims with local contexts, they are far more likely to be seen as 
legitimate than policies which tilt the scales toward either peace or justice.
. . .
The final presentation, by Onur Bakiner, considered the ways in which the concept of 
universal jurisdiction had come into and out of fashion over a long period of time. He 
noted that ideas about universal jurisdiction date at least to anti-piracy laws in the 17th 
century, but that the reach of this concept had grown particularly extensive since the 
end of the Second World War, when it was incorporated into treaty law. By the 1990s 
it acted as the ideational source for legal mobilization around human rights, only to see 
its potential for legal mobilization significantly curtailed in the recent past. 
According to Prof. Bakiner, the recent weakening arose primarily out of a diplomatic 
backlash by states that are increasingly reasserting their primacy in criminal law. His 
ongoing research is endeavoring to understand this process, and thus far he has identified 
a fairly diverse set of actors engaged in the battle over universal jurisdiction.
Contemporary efforts to extend the reach of universal jurisdiction continue to enlist 
support from domestic victims’ groups, from state and international human rights orga-
nizations, and some legal professionals. Some of these advocates support this form of 
criminal accountability because although universal jurisdiction may not be ideal, it is the 
best tool they have to fight for redress of their grievances. And yet, the more human 
rights groups press for the recognition of universal jurisdiction, the more their political 
adversaries oppose it, often arguing that these issues have the capacity to generate a 
great deal of diplomatic friction. 
The political adversaries of the human rights groups also include executives, lawmakers, 
and some legal professionals who have argued for a weakening of the principle. Many 
of these critics have raised significant procedural questions, such as : can prosecution 
take place without the Chief Prosecutor’s consent ? And can prosecution take place if the 
perpetrator is not present ? Changing answers to these questions tend to reflect larger 
changes in the approaches being taken to universal jurisdiction on a social, political and 
legal level.
“We don’t know if  universal jurisdiction is dead, but it is certainly not as 
shiny.” — Onur Bakiner
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In those places that experimented in the 1990s with an expansive approach to universal 
jurisdiction and saw liberal judicial interpretations of that law (Belgium, Spain and the 
UK), statutory changes have significantly reduced the scope of universal jurisdiction over 
time. Where universal jurisdiction was fairly limited from the start (France, Germany 
and the Netherlands), fewer changes have been enacted. One notable change is that 
in all cases it is now much more commonly for victimized nationals to bring cases based 
on this principle.
What the historical trajectory of universal jurisdiction shows is that principled ideas can 
become focal points for dynamic and strategic interactions between a host of state and 
non-state actors. Originally devised as a principle to protect state interests from pirates, 
universal jurisdiction became increasingly relevant for human rights accountability in the 
second half of the 20th century. It was the dialectical unfolding of the emerging human 
rights norm that necessitated the creative re-appropriation of universal jurisdiction to 
overcome impunity promoted in the name of state sovereignty. The creative use of the 
principle empowered a new set of actors, while weakening or eliminating the agenda-
setting and veto powers of others. However, the sudden transformation of the playing 
field resulted in an executive and legislative backlash that took the form of amendments 
to existing universal jurisdiction laws. The amendments rolled back some of the newly 
acquired powers from human rights groups and legal professionals, and strengthened 
administrative, executive and judicial veto players.
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The discussion began with some consideration of the problematic articles of the Rome 
Statute. One participant suggested that Article 13 clearly causes problems, but that 
Article 16 (deferral of process, not investigation) could be useful. This speaker noted 
that this does not impede justice, as a delay of “a year is nothing.” 
The same speaker indicated that it was important to distinguish the different ad hoc 
tribunals and their particular settings. In case of the ICTR, the conflict was terminated 
by victory. “You got victor’s justice, in effect.” In case of the ICTY, the conflict ended with 
negotiated peace. The ICTY already existed before the Dayton peace negotiations, and 
“there was no way we could have negotiated an accountability mechanism at Dayton.”
There was some consensus in the room that the justice-first approach is not always ideal 
especially in contexts like Lebanon and Colombia. One speaker suggested that, rather 
than outline grand principles and specific policies in advance, it is better to follow a 
common law approach of dealing with cases as you encounter them. An approach 
can be one of building through precedence. In relation to Colombia this speaker com-
mented : “I don’t think the role of the ICC in Colombia is useful… What they are trying 
to do in Havana in terms of combining negotiations and accountability is incredibly 
difficult… We know that with all the capacity of the ICTY, and the high cost, it still had 
few convictions… Colombia has strong civil society actors. It has domestic courts and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. So what’s the added value of the ICC ? Let them 
sort it out and move on…”
Another speaker noted that given the fact that the “interest of justice” criteria have not 
been applied in the Colombian case, it was not clear why the ICC was engaged in this 
process. That same speaker also reiterated the point that there is a real danger when 
the issue of justice becomes politicized. The balance had to be based in an awareness 
of the political context, but not in political calculation. Colombia, this speaker concluded, 
was a textbook example of the need to proceed very slowly.
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The Honourable Louise Arbour 
This conference has provided a rich overview of the accomplishments and recurrent as 
well as emerging challenges faced by international criminal justice. The expansion, if 
not the creation, of international criminal law some 22 years ago with the setting up of 
the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and a year later of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), by the UN Security Council, was 
the most imaginative and the most potent expansion of international law since the cre-
ation of the UN. It was surprisingly imaginative in many ways. Created by the UN body 
responsible for the maintenance of “international peace and security”, it unequivocally 
used a legal process – criminal prosecutions – as an instrument of peace, thereby ex-
panding in a novel way the tried and true toolbox of peace management : diplomatic 
engagement, economic sanctions and military intervention.
It was also novel and bold in encroaching dramatically on state sovereignty – for example 
by requiring the cooperation of all states with the Prosecutor, including that the Prosecutor 
be given access to all relevant territory, etc… and, most importantly, by setting aside 
the expected immunity of heads of states from international criminal prosecutions. The 
early successes – all relative but somewhat unexpected – of these two ad hoc tribunals 
were instrumental in gathering the impetus which led to the creation of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) by the Rome statute. Inevitably, compromises were made in moving 
from the coercive diktat of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to a consensual treaty-based 
institution. But not enough compromises, so it seems, to generate the support of the big 
players in the field of armed conflicts.
The core compromise, in my view, was that of replacing the primacy of the international 
prosecutor that the ad hoc tribunals enjoyed, by the principle of complementarity, giv-
ing national courts primacy over the ICC under the obvious conditions of capacity and 
integrity.
Our discussions yielded different views on many issues, including this one. I, for one, be-
lieve that complementarity has failed to deliver its most important intended objective of 
universal ratification while reducing the potency of the court, as evidenced by the Kenya 
case. Ironically, it is under the primacy of ICTY that national courts in the country under 
its jurisdiction have seen a flourishing of national war crimes prosecutions. Flaws such as 
this one will not be easily – or ever – remedied. But they are not fatal. Other factors 
accounting for the current low standing of the institution, not legal but political and 
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cultural factors, will prove harder to overcome. The perception of double standards, 
inevitable until universality of ratification is achieved, is harming the court, as is the 
claim, not always advanced in good faith, that it has unfairly targeted Africa. To the 
extent that the jurisdiction of the court, or lack thereof, can be linked to the existence 
of the veto in the UNSC, there is no question that claims of politicization will continue to 
be credibly made.
As a non-national institution, the ICC will always be an easy target for accusations of 
foreign meddling in domestic affairs, thereby fueling nationalistic reactionary forces 
and even possibly at times negatively affecting both peace processes and democratic 
transitions. For all these potential undesirable consequences arising from accountability 
mechanisms, many of which were exposed and analyzed in this conference, the impetus 
for improving, rather than abandoning, the international criminal justice enterprise is 
alive and healthy.
The ICC, parallel activities in national jurisdictions, continued recourse to a specialized 
forum, like the one trying Hisène Habré in Senegal, and new accountability initiatives, 
like the one launched by the African Union, speak to the irreversibility of what could be 
called “the accountability project”. Part of this wider project includes renewed calls for 
the enforcement of the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention, for example, 
and the movement which led to the creation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Yet 
for all the vitality of this “accountability project” it has suffered recent setbacks, some 
from within, some external. The internal setbacks are likely to be capable of redress. 
Doctrinal inconsistencies, institutional weaknesses, and inadequate leadership are never 
fatal. Combined, though, they may create a period of disenchantment with the entire 
project. It is urgent that they be addressed.
The external challenges were unpredictable and more difficult to control. They are cur-
rently twofold, and will evolve. The first is the dominance of the post 9/11 so-called war 
on terror, and the erosion of norms that it has engendered. These norms included not 
only the Torture Convention but many fundamental principles in International Humanitarian 
and Human Rights law that came to be challenged, directly or not, by many of its previous 
purported champions, thereby exacerbating the perception of double standards already 
prevalent in international relations. These challenges are exacerbated by the rise of 
religious extremism and the early collapse of the “Arab Spring”, renewed international 
armed conflict, and new forms (and perhaps norms) of internal and international armed 
conflicts. New war-related technologies – the use of drones, cyber warfare – will force 
international criminal institutions to keep pace with a new reality on the ground.
Maybe even more significantly, larger concerns related to climate change should continue 
to dominate the international agenda and to mobilize many who will devote their energies 
to this greater universal threat.
c o n c l u d I n g  r e m a r k s
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Meanwhile, activities like this conference remind us of the importance of the ideal of 
justice for all, enshrined in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. More than this, we are also reminded of the need to improve the doctrines and 
institutions devoted to international criminal justice, and to cultivate the new generations 
of leaders who will be essential for its success.
c o n c l u d I n g  r e m a r k s
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a n d  a C r o n y m s
Complementarity
(as defined by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court) 
“Complementarity is one of the foundational principles of the Rome Statute system. 
What was envisioned by the drafters of the Rome Statute was not simply a self-standing 
Court, but rather a comprehensive system of international justice, where the duty on 
States Parties to investigate and prosecute international crimes is clearly reinforced. 
Consequently, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a court of ‘last resort’ and will 
step in where national jurisdictions have failed to address international crimes.”
expressivist theory of law
This theory holds that law is “symbolic”, or “expressive”. It holds that laws should be 
evaluated both in terms of their effectiveness and in terms of the moral and social 
meanings they convey. Law should thus be evaluated in terms of their capacity to achieve 
certain social goals. Moreover, the meanings attached to official actions are relevant to 
determining the moral status of those actions.
fragmentation
(as defined by the Oxford Bibliographies)
“The fragmentation of public international law is a long-observed phenomenon that 
demonstrates uneven normative and institutional development and evolution in inter-state 
relations. Separate legal norms and institutions have developed largely independently 
from one another, often instigated by non-identical groupings of states and in response 
to specific functional issues. The proliferation of courts and tribunals has impacted upon 
long-standing generalist bodies such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
increased the potential for fragmentation and diversification of the law.”
legal Pluralism
(as defined by Wikipedia)
“The existence of multiple legal systems within one (human) population and/or geographic 
area. Plural legal systems are particularly prevalent in former colonies, where the law 
of a former colonial authority may exist alongside more traditional legal systems (cf. 
customary law).”
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ACC    African Criminal Court
ECHR    European Court of Human Rights
ICC    International Criminal Court
ICJ    International Court of Justice
ICTR    International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda
ICTY    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
NGO    Non Government Organization
R2P    Responsibility to Protect
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ernance, International Law and Institutions, and Research Design.
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and acts as pro bono counsel in international justice projects and court cases.
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Bridget Marchesi is a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy in Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, working in the Transitional Justice 
program. Bridget is pursuing a PhD in political science at the University of Minnesota. 
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conditions of adoption affect the quality of policy design and implementation. As a 
Fellow, Marchesi is also working on a Carr Center and Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 
affiliated evaluation of the Colombian Unidad para  las Victimas and the Victims and 
Land Restitution Law. She holds a Master of Public Policy from the Humphrey School of 
Public Affairs and a Master of Business Administration from the Carlson School of Business. 
Her Bachelor of Arts is from Princeton University.
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tional Humanitarian Law to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and Law 
of Armed Conflict Expert Adviser to the Australian Defence Force Director of Military 
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the position of Charles H Stockton Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence at the US Naval 
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Visiting Professor at Harvard Law School to teach International Criminal Law in the 
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Diane Orentlicher is Professor of International Law at the Washington College of Law 
of American University and is Co-Director of the law school’s Center for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law. She has previously served as United Nations Independent 
Expert on Combating Impunity (2004–2005) and as Deputy for War Crimes Issues 
in the US Department of State (2009–2011). She is currently writing a book about 
the impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Bosnia-
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Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (2003–2007). 
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University of Ottawa
An expert on corporate criminal liability, Jennifer Quaid’s research focuses on the theo-
retical and practical aspects of applying the criminal law to organizations. Her current 
work proposes a new framework within which to analyze organizational responsibility 
for mens rea crimes using an interdisciplinary approach that brings together law and 
elements of organization theory. A graduate of the University of Ottawa in both law 
and economics, Quaid holds graduate degrees from the University of Cambridge and at 
Columbia University and is currently completing a doctorate in law at Queen’s University. 
Before joining the academy, she practiced law for several years, first with Canada’s 
federal Department of Justice and then in private practice.
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where he is part of the ERC-funded project : “The Individualization of War : Reconfigur-
ing the Morality, Law, and Politics of Armed Conflict”. He holds a DPhil in International 
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tional Studies from the University of Queensland. Reike has also worked for Amnesty 
International.
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Dr. Rizvi is a writer and physician who grew up in Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan 
before immigrating to Canada. He is a regular contributor to the Huffington Post and 
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currently writing his first book, The Atheist Muslim, which explores the challenges faced 
by secularists and reformers in Muslim majority countries.
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Fellowship at Columbia Law School, where she worked for the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Policy Branch, and completed her LL.M 
with honors. Her book, Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention, was published by Cambridge 
University Press in 2015. 
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several honorary doctorates.
beth a. simmons
Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard Government Department 
Harvard University
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Years (1994). She was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 2013.
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holds a DPhil in Political Science from the University of Toronto, where she completed a 
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in Europe-Asia Studies, Human Rights Review, and Global Change, Peace, and Security. 
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James G. Stewart has spent the past 15 years working in international criminal justice, 
as either a practitioner or a scholar. He joined the University of British Columbia Law 
Faculty in August 2009, after spending two years as an Associate-in-Law at Columbia 
Law School in New York. Before then, he was an Appeals Counsel with the Prosecu-
tion of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
He also worked for the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
and the Prosecution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. At present, he 
works as a Senior Legal Advisor (part-time) to judges of the Appeals Chamber of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. He holds degrees from Victoria 
University of Wellington, New Zealand in both law and philosophy, a Diplôme d’études 
approfondies in international humanitarian law from Université de Genève and a JSD 
from Columbia Law School. He has received the Cassese Prize in International Criminal 
Justice and an Open Society Fellowship, and was a Global Hauser Fellow at NYU Law 
School for his research on the relationship between atrocity commerce, and international 
criminal law. This research, together with a blog on associated issues, is available online 
at jamesgstewart.com.
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
stephen J. toope
Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Professor of International Law
University of Toronto
Stephen J. Toope is Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Professor of 
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